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Notation
a support for uniform distributions
A marginal benefits from self-reporting
B marginal costs of self-reporting
b(u) private benefit from violation (for player u=1,2)
b subscript for fines if both self-report
b maximum private benefit
b˜(u) borderline type who only just violates
c unit costs per case investigated
c superscript for cooperative teams
C(i)(p) monitoring costs (in self-reporting stage i = 1, 2)
D marginal costs due to non-illicit crime
e subscript for extended model
f(b) density of private benefits
F (b) cumulative distribution of private benefits
g(j)(θ) density of individual detection probabilities
(in stage j = 1, 2 or for player j = H,L)
G(j)(θ) cumulative distribution of individual detection probabilities
h(m=1,2,3) harm (in stage m = 1, 2, 3)
H subscript for high evidence provider
k self-reporting fine for reporting teams
l(j) self-reporting fine for simultaneous reporting team members
L subscript for low evidence provider
n superscript for noncooperative teams
ns superscript for the case without self-reporting
N(j) no self-reporting (strategy)
N = NH/NL no self-reporting (strategy tuple)
p(i) monitoring frequency for single violators
P(i) monitoring frequency for criminal teams
q cooperation rate
r
(j)
(i) fine reduction for self-reporters
s maximum fine
s subscript for fines if a single violator self-reports
S(j) self-reporting (strategy)
S = SH/SL self-reporting (strategy tuple)
SC social costs
t transaction costs
t maximum transaction costs
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α(o=1,2,H,L) imperfect conviction probability (of player o = 1, 2, H, L)
∆ gain from cooperation
φ(j) expected fine for a single violator
Φ(i) (maximum) expected fine for criminal teams
λ(i) self-reporting frequency
µ Lagrange multiplier
Ω authority’s policy vector
pi violation frequency
σ(θ) standard deviation of individual detection probabilities
θ(j) individual detection probability
θ˜(j) borderline type who only just self-reports
∗ indicates the optimal value
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Abbreviations
AO Abgaben Ordnung
Art. Artikel
CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act
EU European Union
FOC First Order Condition
IRS Internal Revenue Service
KronzG Kronzeugenregelung
KS 1994 Kaplow and Shavell (1994)
o¨StGB o¨sterreichisches Strafgesetzbuch
SOC Second Order Condition
StGB Strafgesetzbuch
StPO Strafprozessordnung
US(A) United States (of America)
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
It is a part of almost every legal system that confessing violators pay lower
fines. Punishments for criminals who provide evidence against collaborators
in a legal litigation are typically reduced, tax-evaders have the opportunity
to self-report there behavior, criminal teams like cartels or institutions of
organized crime are prosecuted with leniency programs that try to induce
mistrust among the team members by granting high fine reductions or even
subsidies for confessing criminals. In the economic analysis two fundamental
cases need to be distinguished. In the so called single violator case, each
individual acts on his own, and it can easily be shown that reducing the fines
for confessing (or self-reporting) violators will then always lead to a lower
expected fine if the authority’s investigation effort is not higher than in the
situation without self-reporting. This follows simply from the fact that (risk
aversion excluded) a violator will never come forward if this increases his ex-
pected fine. In fact, the literature has shown that the incentive to violate will
always be higher with the possibility of self-reporting if a violator does not
know whether he will self-report or not at the moment when he commits the
crime (i.e. in the presence of asymmetric information) - and this is clearly
the relevant case in many, if not in almost all, circumstances. Nevertheless,
even in the single violator case, there are many good reasons to accept this
weakness of fine reductions as there are also many advantages. First, self-
reporting violators do not have to be detected, and this saves investigation
costs. Second, the authority may get higher (expected) revenues, which has
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
widely been emphasized in the case of tax amnesties, for instance. Third, it
may be important that the authority learns about the criminal case as early
as possible in order to undertake cost-reducing countermeasures. Fourth,
confessions may help to reduce both types of errors in court (i.e. the type
I-error that guilty defendants are exonerated and the type II-error that in-
nocent defendants are convicted). Finally, the incentive of violators to invest
in (socially) costly evasion strategies may diminish.
This may illustrate that the authority faces a trade-off when designing
self-reporting schemes in the single violator case: Although there are many
advantages of fine reductions, they inevitably enhance the ex ante incentive
to violate a law if the authority’s investigation effort is the same. This
situation changes drastically when criminal teams are considered. Then, the
strategic interdependence between two or more violators can be exploited to
increase the expected fine of each violator even if the monitoring probability
decreases. The idea is closely related to the Prisoner’s Dilemma - since each
participant of a criminal team knows that his risk of being convicted increases
if his accomplice confesses, he may have an incentive to confess, too. Hence,
it may be an equilibrium that all team members try to be the first one
to self-report, although all of them could be better off if they were able
to credibly commit that no one of them self-reports. Clearly, the original
Prisoner’s Dilemma refers to the situations where the violators have already
been detected, but the basic idea carries over to the pre-detection stage under
certain circumstances. This is exactly the idea of a race to the courtroom
that is exploited in corporate leniency programs (see chapter 2).
To summarize, an economic analysis of self-reporting in optimal law en-
forcement has to incorporate asymmetric information (about the individual
detection probabilities of each violator) and strategic interactions (among
members of criminal teams). This is the central issue of the thesis.
1.2 Contribution
Of course, understanding our contributions and their motivation requires first
a description of the legal situation and the literature which will be provided
in chapters 2 and 3, respectively. The subsequent chapters 4-7 will then
summarize four research papers dealing with self-reporting both in the single
violator case (chapters 4 and 5) and the multiple violator case (chapters 6
and 7).
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In the first model for the single violator case (described in chapter 4),
we analyze the impact of ex post asymmetric information on the authority’s
optimal behavior that consists of costly monitoring and fine reduction for
self-reporting individuals. By ex post asymmetric information, we account
for the fact that violators will only come forward if they realize after the
violation that their individual detection probabilities (their ”types”) exceed
a critical threshold. We model this by assuming that the offenders get private
signals about their probabilities of apprehension after they committed an
offense. Whereas the result that the optimal self-reporting scheme is welfare
enhancing even under these circumstances is almost straightforward and has
already been derived in the literature, we go one step further by trying to
characterize the impact of the violators’ ex post heterogeneity on the optimal
self-reporting scheme. This step has been motivated by the insight that
pure existence proofs are not very helpful for judges or legal scholars when
searching for schemes applicable in reality. We show that the optimal fine
reduction decreases in the degree of heterogeneity if the criminals’ types
are uniformly distributed. For general distribution functions, the impact of
heterogeneity on the optimal fine is ambiguous. We identify and interpret
the countervailing effects. Thereby, one has to be careful when thinking
about the relevance and the degree of ex post asymmetric information. For
instance, a tax evader or a manager engaged in illegal collusive behavior
will only self-report if he learns that the authority focuses on his kind of
illegal activity. However, even though a violator then gets important new
information, this information is due to the authority’s own behavior and
can therefore be taken into account when deciding upon the fine reduction.
The degree of ex post asymmetric information is low, and neglecting ex post
optimal fine adjustments requires asymmetric information. For instance,
consider a robber who realizes that he has left footprints when he buried the
money. When he self-reports early enough, the authority will not find out
about his sloppiness. More generally, the criminal’s estimation of his own
cleverness will change after having committed a crime, and the authority
will not care about how many mistakes a self-reporting criminal may have
realized. Summing up, the higher the impact of the authority’s behavior on
the new information, the lower the degree of ex post asymmetric information.
This contribution is based on Walzl (2003).
Our second contribution to the single violator case extends the analysis to
the question whether fine reductions should only be granted before a violator
is detected, or even if he is already detected but not yet convicted (see chapter
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5). Distinguishing between two self-reporting stages is practically important,
because the legal treatment differs among different fields of application (see
chapter 2). In both stages, we assume that individuals get private signals on
their actual probabilities of detection and conviction, respectively. This is
required as it can easily be shown that the analysis does not make any sense
at all without allowing for ex post asymmetric information. Then, we first
show that the possibility to self-report even if one is already investigated not
only enhances the incentive for crime, but also reduces the incentive to report
early in the game. We show that granting fine reductions in both stages is
socially optimal, and the authority can always induce the same violation
frequency at lower costs by adjusting its effort accordingly. This part has
been taken from Feess and Walzl (2003a).
In chapters 6 and 7, we contribute to the very recent and very small
literature on self-reporting schemes for criminal teams. At first glance, it
seems to be a simple task to exploit the basic idea of the Prisoner’s dilemma
even to the pre-detection stage, i.e. to situations where the violators have
not been detected yet. If the authority offers a complete amnesty for the
first self-reporter, trying to be the first one becomes a dominant strategy,
and this should perfectly eliminate all incentives for illegal behavior in teams
at virtually no cost. The starting point of our two papers presented is why
those simple self-reporting schemes do not work that smooth in reality.
In chapter 6 (based on Feess and Walzl (2002), we analyze drawbacks of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure arising from the fact that the team has not
been detected yet. Depending on the specific structure of cooperation, the
members of the team will either decide separately or jointly whether they will
self-report or not. If each member of the team decides separately, they can in
fact be driven in a situation that comes close to the Prisoner’s dilemma, and
that is usually discussed as a ”race to the courtroom” in the legal literature
(the difference being that, for both practical and legal reasons, the fine for a
self-reporter can not be made contingent on whether the accomplice has tried
to self-report or not). Furthermore, we show that the results do actually not
change if the degree of cooperation in the self-reporting stage is exogenously
given. However, the threat of being driven in a Prisoner’s dilemma may
motivate the members of the criminal team to search for credible commitment
devices, thereby making the degree of cooperation endogenous. We show
that this leads to serious adjustments of the optimal mechanism, and helps to
explain self-reporting schemes observed in reality. Another drawback of races
to the courtroom is the fact that a confession of one member of a criminal
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team does not necessarily lead to a conviction of other team members. This
imperfection of self-reporting diminishes the incentive to confess if another
team member cooperates with the authority.
Finally, chapter 7 (based on Feess and Walzl (2003b)) focuses on a com-
parison of corporate leniency programs in the EU and in the USA. Under
both legislations, cartel members can receive fine reductions if they self-
report and if they provide useful information (either with respect to other
cartel members or with respect to re-establishing a competitive market struc-
ture). Although both programs try to exploit the strategic interaction among
members of criminal teams, they also differ in various, economically inter-
esting aspects. Main distinctions refer to the magnitude of fine reductions,
to the fine reductions granted for other firms besides the first self-reporting
firm, to differences in the fine reductions in the pre- or post-detection stage,
and to the impact of the evidence provided. To account for these differences,
we need to develop a relatively complex model with two self-reporting stages
and ex post asymmetric information. However, the model allows us some
conclusions as to when the one or the other program seems to be superior.
Chapter 2
Legal Situation
2.1 Overview
Since the focus of this thesis is on a theory of optimal law enforcement rather
than on a detailed description or international comparison of legal systems,
we will only sketch the legal situation in Europe and the US as to illustrate
the importance of self-reporting schemes in legal practice. Thereby, we want
to highlight some of the controversies our economic analysis contributes to.
As for this, we start with some general remarks explaining the significance
of fine reductions for self-reporting violators (section 2.2). Afterwards, we
depict the legal situation for self-reporting tax evaders in somewhat greater
detail in section 2.3 for two reasons. First, the law enforcement against tax
evasion has always been the most prominent example for an application of fine
reductions. Second, the fact that (different) fine reductions are granted both
before and after a wrong tax declaration has been detected has motivated
the economic analysis described in chapter 4 and 5 of the thesis. Finally,
section 2.4 explains the differences in the corporate leniency programs in the
USA and in the European Union (EU) since we focus on corporate leniency
programs in the economic analysis in chapters 6 and 7.
2.2 General Remarks
In this section, we briefly illustrate that fine-reductions for self-reporting in-
dividuals are a widely accepted tool of law enforcement. To structure the
description of the various applications consider first that a statute law sys-
6
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tem like the German StGB (”Strafgesetzbuch”) distinguishes between fine-
reductions that are granted because the potential violator has refused to
complete (or even start) his criminal activity (”Ru¨cktritt vom Versuch”)
and fine-reductions for self-reporters who have completed the criminal act
(”Ru¨cktritt trotz Schadenseinritt”). As an example for the first class of legal
rules consider corruption in a procurement auction. If the briber who has
won the auction illegally self-reports his violation before he executes the pro-
cured project, § 289 Abs.3 Satz 1 grants full immunity. For such cases there
is only an ongoing controversy about the definition of the requirements like
voluntarity and subjective or objective detection, but no debate about the
usefulness of the rule itself (see Eser (2001)). As opposed to this, fine reduc-
tions in case of completed criminal acts are still under legal discussion (see
e.g. the controversy about tax-amnesties below) such that we will focus on
this problem in our economic analysis and (consequently) in our description
of the legal situation.
To further classify the different legal rules, it is appropriate to distinguish
between fine-reductions for self-reporting violators before or after the crime
has been detected. Fine reductions granted before the violation has been
detected are virulent in the law enforcement against tax evasion or cartels
(see below). In addition, most law systems provide fine-reductions for mem-
bers of foreign secret services or collaborations of organized crime if they
provide valuable information about their organization (see e.g. §§ 81, 82,
261 StGB, §30 of the Criminal Justice Act (Great-Britain) or the Anti Drug
Abuse Act in the USA). Another prominent example for fine reductions is
the self-auditing policy of the Environmental Protection Agency of the US
federal government. If a firm promptly discloses violations of environmental
standards, punitive damages will be reduced (see Pfaff et al. (2003)).
Fine reductions after a criminal act has been detected are somewhat less
frequent and are lower compared to those before a detection, but are usually
granted if a violator shows socially valuable behavior (such that litigation
costs can be saved, for instance) even if his case has already been detected.
Furthermore, fine reductions are usually applied if a defendant (voluntarily)
compensates the victim (this is widely adopted in European countries like
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain (see Keudel (2000)). The
same logic that the violator can reduce social costs with his behavior after
he has been detected (or even convicted) underlies cases where the defendant
serves as a witness for the prosecutor (as e.g. the controversial ”Kronzeugen-
regelung” in the German KronzG, Art. 4, 5). These rules play an important
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rule to simplify the prosecution of terroristic organizations or collaborations
of organized crime. Finally, it is possible in some European systems (e.g.
according to § 153 StPO in Germany) that a trial is closed by the prosecu-
tor if the defendant commits to obey some obligations (”Auflagen”). This
is related to the US practice of plea bargaining where the two parties of a
law suit are allowed to settle the case without a trial. Note, however, that
in the German system the threat-points are in favor of the prosecutor as he
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the defendant which is not the case in the
USA where the prosecutor and the defendant’s attorney negotiate about the
pre-trial fine reduction.
2.3 Tax Amnesties
Let us now turn to tax evasion as a prominent field of application. In Ger-
many, § 371 Abgabenordnung (AO) grants full immunity for tax evaders who
correct untruthful reports to the tax authority if the case is not yet detected
(both subjectively (for the tax-evader) and objectively (in the sense that there
is not already a sufficient amount of evidence against the evader)). This rule
is still under controversy between legal scholars that interpret immunity for
tax evaders as a tool to increase tax revenues (fiscal theory) and scholars
that focus on the consequences for criminal law (criminal theory). The fiscal
theory stresses the positive incentive effect that tax evaders prefer to correct
their report if full immunity is granted (see e.g. Firnhaber (1962)). This
incentive effect is doubted by new interpretations that follow the criminal
theory (see e.g. Lo¨ffler (1992)) and emphasize deterrence effects. The main
point of critique is that full immunity completely destroys any deterrence
effect ex-ante. In particular, it is unclear why full immunity is introduced for
tax evaders as opposed to (moderate) fine reductions in general criminal law
e.g. for other kinds of frauds in § 263 StGB. Even more surprisingly, very
high fine reductions are possible if the case is already under investigation i.e.
if the tax-authority has already collected additional material. 1
By contrast2, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the US government
only grants fine reductions for self-reporters in the so-called Voluntary Dis-
closure Policy if the case is not yet under investigation (”Trigger Doctrine”).
Furthermore, a dolose self-reporting where the authority learns that a self-
1For a more detailed description of the legal situation see Heesen (2003).
2The following description is taken from Abramowski (1991).
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reporting tax evader has not corrected his tax declaration completely in-
creases overall fines as opposed to the German system where the dolose
self-reporter can still get full immunity for the evasions he has reported on
truthfully.
Even more differently to the German situation, a maximum fine reduction
of only 20 percent can be granted in Great Britain. Fines depend on the gains
from early detection and on the chance to detect the evasion without self-
reporting. Furthermore the reduction increases if the evader voluntarily and
completely reports. A similar rule is established by the Swiss Steuergesetz
Basel Stadt, § 26 Abs. 3. In Austria, § 167 o¨StGB grants full immunity
for any (minor) criminal act that is not yet detected (including tax evasion)
while Spain restricts the possibility of full immunity to tax-evasion.
To summarize, most legal systems offer higher fine reductions for self-
reporting tax evaders than for other violators. However, the magnitude of the
fine reductions and the definition of ”voluntarily” differ considerably among
countries. We address this question in the model presented in chapter 4.
Furthermore, the most controversial point is whether (and if yes, at which
magnitude) fine reductions should also be offered if the tax evader has already
been detected. This controversy will be investigated economically in chapter
5 of our study.
2.4 Leniency Programs in Cartel Prosecution
Corporate leniency programs (i.e. fine reductions for cartel members stopping
their own criminal activity and providing information about the remaining
members of the cartel) are part of the cartel prosecution in both the US
and the EU. Although the two programs share some common features, they
also differ in some economically meaningful aspects. As to prepare the eco-
nomic analysis, our description of the legal situation tries to highlight these
differences.
The US Amnesty Program was initially enacted in 1978. However, only
after significant modifications concerning the fines for not reported cartel
activity (average fines increased by a factor of 15 between 1996 and 1998)
and concerning the transparency of the legal procedure in 1993,3 the program
3Fine reductions are now granted automatically if some formal requirements
are fullfilled. In fact, self-reporters only have to follow a simple proce-
dure that is outlined on the homepage of the US Department of Justice
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has become successful in the sense that it has led to a ten-fold increase in
amnesty applications from 1995 to 2000 (as detailed in Hammond (2000)4).
For a deeper economic analysis, the following aspects of the (modified) legal
procedure are crucial:
(i) A firm that is the first one to report cartel activity if the case is not
yet detected in the sense that the authority has already gathered a sufficient
amount of evidence against the cartel, can now be sure to get full amnesty
if some requirements are fulfilled. Most importantly, the firm must not be
the leader of the cartel. In addition it has to cooperate in the following trial
against other members and it has to compensate if possible. Furthermore, the
self-reporting cartel member must not have forced other members to illegal
activity.
(ii) This implies that the fine reduction does not depend on the amount
of evidence provided, given that there is a fine reduction at all.
(iii) A second self-reporting firm does not get any fine reduction at all.
Hammond, Director of Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Division em-
phasizes that this winner-take-all approach leads to tension and mistrust
among the cartel members (for obvious reasons often referred to as a race to
the courtroom), thereby reducing the incentive to engage in cartel activity at
all.5
(iv) Full immunity can, but does not have to be granted if the case is
already under investigation. 6
In February 2002, the European Union modified its leniency program
that has initially been enacted in 1996. This program is supposed to lead
to significantly higher incentives to self-report than the former regulation.
Although the new procedure has reduced the gap between the US- and the
EU-regulations (i.e. it is now more important to be the first self-reporter
while the amount of evidence provided plays only a minor role), the following
differences are still important:7
(www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm).
4Of course, this is not necessarily an indicator for a welfare enhancement due to the
leniency program. An econometric analysis would have to control for an increase in the
number of violations.
5”If you are second, even if only by a matter of a few hours, which has happened on a
number of occasions, the second firm and all of its culpable executives will be subject to
full prosecution” (Hammond 2000, p.5).
6See e.g. Spartling (1999), Hammond (2000) or the official guidelines in
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm.
7See e.g. European Union (2002).
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(i) The first self-reporting firm will usually get only partial immunity,
although a full amnesty is not excluded.
(ii) The fine reduction depends crucially on the amount of evidence pro-
vided.
(iii) Other self reporting firms can also get (although certainly lower) fine
reductions.
(iv) If the case is already under investigation, the maximum fine reduction
for the first self-reporting firm amounts to 50 percent. In addition, cartel
leaders are not excluded from the program. Even if the reporting member
evidently forces other members to illegal activity, fine reductions can be
granted if the amount of evidence provided is sufficiently high.
In some respects, the German law against cartel activity implemented
in April 2000, is in-between the two programs described above (see Achen-
bach (2000)). As in the EU, full immunity can, but does not have to be
granted if the cartel activity is not yet detected. Again - similar to the new
EU-regulation - the maximum fine reduction for the first self-reporting firm
amounts to 50 percent if the case is already under investigation. However,
other important points depart from the EU-regulation and come close to
rules adopted in the US: Only the first reporter can get fine-reductions, and
cartel leaders are excluded.
To summarize, an international comparison of leniency programs shows
different treatments with respect to the (i) automatic fine reduction if the
case has not been detected yet, (ii) the dependence of fine-reductions on the
amount of evidence provided, (iii) the opportunity to get fine-reductions if
another cartel member has already submitted a report, and (iv) the reduction
if the case is already under investigation. We will analyze the applicability
of self-reporting schemes in the prosecution of criminal teams in chapter 6
and compare the different legal situations in the EU and the US in the model
presented in chapter 7.
Chapter 3
Review of the Literature
3.1 Overview and Structure
To understand the literature review, it is first necessary to describe the broad
connection between the literature on self-reporting to the one on plea bar-
gaining and on settlements, respectively. As already mentioned in the In-
troduction, the literature on self-reporting focusses on the trade-off between
deterrence effects and cost-savings that determines optimal fine-reductions
for violators that report a criminal act before this is detected by the au-
thority. In the literature on plea bargaining, it is assumed that a prosecutor
and a defendant bargain about a fine-reduction if the defendant accepts that
he is guilty. In the United States, plea bargaining is of major importance.
For instance, about 80% of kidnapping and assault-cases are settled out of
court, and plea bargaining is still successful in about 68% of murder cases.1
Although the literature branches on self-reporting and on plea bargaining
are both dealing with fine reductions for individuals who confess their illegal
behavior, the research differs in several aspects. All of these different aspects
are related to the fact that, in the literature on plea bargaining, it is assumed
that an individual has already been detected but not yet convicted, whereas
in the self-reporting literature it is usually assumed that an individual is
even not detected. This leads to a different focus: since the literature on
plea bargaining deals with the settlement between a prosecutor and a per-
sonally known defendant, the bargaining process can be modelled much more
explicitly. The topic analyzed in the plea bargaining-literature is then how
1See Reinganum (2000), p. 68.
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costs can be saved by avoiding that a case comes to court. Conversely, in
the self-reporting literature, the bargaining game between the prosecutor and
the criminal is not modelled explicitly, instead it is simply assumed that the
fine reduction for confessing individuals is known right from the beginning.
Hence, the fine reduction is the same for all individuals that committed the
same crime and there is no prosecutor who offers different contracts for dif-
ferent individuals. Thus, the self-reporting literature restricts its attention
to situations where the fine reduction is (almost) perfectly known ex ante,
which is realistic, for instance, in the case of tax evasion.
Whereas the advantage of the plea bargaining-literature can be seen in
the fact that the negotiations are analyzed more explicitly, the advantage
of the self-reporting literature is that the deterrence aspect of fine reduc-
tions in exchange for confessions can be treated more precisely. In the plea
bargaining-literature, it is usually assumed that the prosecutor either maxi-
mizes the defendant’s expected fine from settlement and litigation or an ob-
jective function that consists of both expected fines and the litigation costs
(pre-trial negotiations are usually assumed to be costless or less costly than
legal litigations). Since it is assumed that the defendant has already been
detected, the detection stage (and hence the impact of the authority’s effort
on an individual’s incentive to violate a law) are not explicitly taken into ac-
count. This is emphasized in the literature on self-reporting where different
informational settings are considered to describe the connection between the
authority’s behavior and the deterrence effect.
Next, we consider the difference between the literature on plea bargain-
ing and the one on settlements. In both kinds of literature, the bargaining
process between two parties is explicitly modelled, so that there is a close
relationship between the two strings of research. Whereas the literature on
plea bargaining refers to the negotiations between a prosecutor and a defen-
dant, the settlement literature is concerned with the negotiations between
two private parties, usually a plaintiff and a defendant (or their respective
attorneys). As mentioned above, with respect to the prosecutor it is often
assumed that he is concerned about the maximum punishment and the cost
of litigation which can be interpreted in the sense that he maximizes some
kind of social welfare function. Conversely, in the settlement literature, both
parties are only concerned about their private benefits. The focus is then on
the impact of different settlement and sharing rules of litigation costs (e.g.
the comparison of the English and the American rules of cost allocation) on
the frequency of settlements. Thereby, relatively complicated information
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structures and settlement games are taken into account, so that this kind
of literature often comes close to the general literature on (non-cooperative)
bargaining. Conversely to the self-reporting- and to the plea bargaining-
literature, the settlement-literature is not concerned about the deterrence
effect of different settlement rules and legal procedures (e.g. on the incentive
to take care to avoid accidents), since the starting point is that a damage
has already occurred.
In all of the three parts of the literature (self-reporting, plea bargain-
ing and settlements) an important distinction refers to whether just one or
more defendants are considered. Whereas the overwhelming percentage of
the contributions restricts attention to the single-defendant case, there are
also some papers dealing with two or more defendants. In the literature on
self-reporting, this means that a violation can be committed by a criminal
team, for instance, so that strategic interactions between the criminals arise
when deciding upon self-reporting in the pre-detection stage. Comparable
strategic interactions between the members of a criminal team arise in the
plea bargaining literature where the fine reduction offered may depend on
the evidence provided upon an accomplice. As we will discuss in detail in
chapter 6, the strategic interaction in the detection and the conviction stage
(when no or at least one of the criminals is already detected, respectively) is,
however, somewhat different. Finally, the settlement literature also consid-
ers the case with multiple defendants and focuses on the analysis of different
settlement rules which differ with respect to the division of total payments
between the defendants in case one or more of them agree to a settlement.
Consequently, our literature review proceeds as follows: in section 3.2,
we start with the literature on self-reporting, followed by the plea bargaining
literature in section 3.3 and the settlement literature in section 3.4. In each
part, we start with the single violator case and then proceed with multiple
violators. As the results from the models that are most closely related to
our contribution can be easily reproduced as benchmark solutions in our
framework, we will come back to them in subsequent sections and restrict
ourselves to a brief intuition of the key results in this chapter.
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3.2 Literature on Self-reporting
Single Violator Case
Basic Model In their seminal paper on self-reporting, Kaplow and Shavell
(1994) (KS 1994) have shown that social costs of law enforcement can be re-
duced by lowering fines for self-reporting individuals. The idea is straightfor-
ward: if the sanction for a reported violation is infinitesimally smaller than
the expected fine for being detected, then all (risk-neutral) violators prefer
to self-report. While deterrence remains unchanged (as the fine reduction
is infinitesimal), cost savings are substantial as only the fraction of individ-
uals that did not report need to be monitored by the authority. This cost
advantage seems to be realistic for tax-evasion, for instance, while it is only
marginal for monitoring technologies with high fixed costs and low unit costs
like the monitoring of speed limits. Note, however, that in equilibrium every
violator self-reports, so that the authority has to commit itself to (costly)
investigate a society of innocent individuals. This problem of credibility of
the authority’s optimal policy is the major criticism to KS 1994 and has been
the starting point of a variety of variants that avoid full self-reporting in the
subgame perfect equilibrium.2
KS 1994 themselves consider several extensions of their basic model.
First, if imposing fines on violators (regardless of wether they have self-
reported or have been detected by the authority) is costly, the opportunity
to self-report does not need to be beneficial anymore. To see this, recall that
in the basic model all violators self-report in equilibrium, but this is associ-
ated with high administrative costs of imposing a self-reporting fine, while
without self-reporting, there is only a (typically small) probability to detect a
violator, and consequently only a small number of occasions where fines need
to be collected. Therefore, an opportunity to self-report is only beneficial if
administrative costs are sufficiently small compared to monitoring costs.3
Second, they show that imperfect monitoring technologies (i.e. finite
probabilities to proof innocent individuals guilty or guilty individuals non-
guilty) increase the benefit from self-reporting. Obviously, imperfect moni-
toring technologies are no drawback for self-reporting schemes as again deter-
rence remains unchanged while costs are reduced as discussed above. How-
2These variants are discussed below.
3A similar result has been derived by Malik (1993) in a model of imperfect monitoring
of environmental harm.
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ever, cost reductions increase with respect to the basic model because in
the presence of imperfect monitoring technologies more people violate ceteris
paribus (as obeying the law becomes pointless for them with some probabil-
ity) such that cost savings are larger.
Third, the inclusion of costly imprisonment as a fine for non-reporting
violators also enhances the benefit from self-reporting as, once again, every
violator self-reports, and the authority only has to commit to put viola-
tors into jail that do not act along the equilibrium path. Finally, for risk-
averse individuals a self-reporting scheme is an insurance such that there is
an incentive to self-report even if the fine is above the expected one without
self-reporting.4 Furthermore, self-reporting rules out the problem of over-
deterrence of risk-averse individuals (as discussed in Polinsky and Shavell
(1984)) because individuals no longer over-invest into a socially inefficient
care-level if there is an opportunity to self-report.
Further Advantages of Self-Reporting Innes (1999) discusses another
advantage of self-reporting schemes. He deliberately neglects that monitor-
ing costs depend on the number of individuals that need to be investigated
by assuming instead that the authority always monitors a fixed fraction of
individuals. In contrast, he focuses on the fact that in case of self-reporting
countermeasures can be taken right away, which is important in the case of
environmental harm, for instance. Consequently, the harm from the criminal
activity is smaller if a violator is detected or self-reports. First, this obviously
creates another advantage of self-reporting. Second, note that as the moni-
toring frequency does not only increase deterrence but reduces harm, costly
monitoring and the fine for a detected violation are no longer perfect substi-
tutes. This undermines the key argument of Becker (1968) that the authority
should always impose the maximum fine as this allows for a costless substi-
tution of costly monitoring. Consequently, an additional advantage of self-
reporting occurs because if every violator reports in equilibrium (this holds
as optimal self-reporting fines equal expected fines without self-reporting as
in KS 1994), monitoring has no longer any influence on harm reduction, but
only on deterrence. Therefore Becker’s argument and the associated cost
savings are restored.
4While models on self-reporting mostly assume risk-neutrality, the literature on tax
amnesties starting with Reinganum and Wilde (1985) typically deals with risk-avers tax-
evaders.
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A third advantage of self-reporting has been analyzed in Innes (2001). He
focuses on the impact of self-reporting schemes on (socially wasteful) evasion
strategies of the violators. The possibility to invest into evasion may lead to
optimal fines for detected violators that are below the maximum fine that can
be imposed.5 If the authority offers the opportunity to self-report before the
individuals decide upon investment into evasion, social costs associated with
this investment will be saved. In the absence of any investment into evasion,
however, the fine for detected violators is again a perfect substitute for the
(costly) monitoring frequency, such that Becker’s argument is restored and
maximum fines can be imposed.
To summarize, self-reporting in the single violator case has five advan-
tages: The fraction of cases that need to be investigated is reduced, coun-
termeasures can be taken right away such that harm in case of self-reporting
is reduced, self-reporting provides an insurance for risk-averse criminals, it
avoids costly evasion strategies and it restores the Becker-argument.
Ex-Ante Asymmetric Information For all of the models of self-reporting
introduced so far, we already mentioned that every violator self-reports in
equilibrium such that the authority has to commit herself to (costly) investi-
gate innocent individuals. Presumably the most obvious way to circumvent
full self-reporting in equilibrium is introducing ex-ante heterogeneous viola-
tors in the sense that different individuals know about their different prob-
abilities of apprehension even before they decide upon violation. If these
individual detection probabilities are private information to the violators
(we will refer to this as ex-ante asymmetric information), the authority can
only design a law enforcement scheme contingent on the distribution of the
violators’ private information. Clearly, stochastic monitoring leads to under-
deterrence of violators with a low (individual) probability of apprehension
and to over-deterrence of other violators.6
5Garoupa (1997) reviews other reasons leading to fines below the maximum one.
6Of course, over-deterrence can only occur in models where a potential violator’s private
costs of avoiding harm are taken into account in the social welfare function. This is
reasonable in cases where the probability of a violation depends on the (socially) costly
care level of a firm or an individual (e.g. in cases of environmental harm). Then, it is
obvious that over-deterrence may arise: Consider, for example, an individual detection
probability close to one together with a high fine for detected violations, a relatively low
level of harm, and relatively high marginal abatement costs. This immediately leads to a
inefficiently high care-level of the individual.
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Introducing a self-reporting scheme, however, will provide a useful tool
against over-deterrence as individuals with a high detection probability only
need to pay reduced (self-reporting) fines. On the other hand, under-deterrence
will not be affected by such a mechanism as violators with a very low prob-
ability of apprehension will not self-report and face the same expected fine
than without the opportunity to self-report. Thus, adding ex ante hetero-
geneity among individuals into the basic model of self-reporting leads to two
insights: first, it explains in a simple way why we observe only partial self-
reporting in equilibrium. Second, it highlights that self-reporting mitigates
problems of over-deterrence without aggravating the risk of under-deterrence.
A related reasoning for partial self-reporting has been elaborated in the
model by Livernois and McKenna (1999). They consider optimal law en-
forcement against pollution and assume that the authority is able to enforce
a proper (costly) filtering technology at least for the next period. If the main-
tenance costs of such a technology are private information for the pollutes,
then there is a individual component in the fines for self-reporters such that
only those pollutes will self-report whose maintenance costs are sufficiently
low even if full immunity is granted by the authority.
Ex-Post Asymmetric Information In the models we reviewed so far, the
private information of the violators (individual detection probability in Innes
(1999) and individual maintenance costs in Livernois and McKenna (1996))
has been revealed to them ex ante. The main deficit of ex ante asymmetric
information is that, although it allows to explain partial self-reporting, it
does not account for the main problem of self-reporting schemes emphasized
by legal scholars (see e.g. Heesen (2003)), namely that they ceteris paribus
enhance the incentive to violate the law. To see this recall that for the in-
dividual who is indifferent between violating and obeying the law benefits
from crime equal expected fines. If the self-reporting fine is almost equal the
expected fine without self-reporting, this individual will be indifferent again.
The literature on tax amnesties, however, focuses on information up-dates for
tax-evaders with respect to their utility functions or their individual detec-
tion probabilities occurring only after they decided to submit a false report
to the tax authority. We will refer to these situations as ex-post asymmetric
information. If individuals decide upon violation and self-reporting in dif-
ferent information sets in the sense that they become better informed about
their preferences or detection probabilities, the opportunity to self-report ex-
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hibits an option value for the violator, as he may self-report e.g. for high
probabilities of apprehension and refuses to do so otherwise. This ceteris
paribus enhances the violation frequency. 7 Hence, it seems to be fair to
say that only ex post asymmetric information is suited as to compare the
advantages of self-reporting schemes to their drawbacks.
A seminal analysis as to this is Malik and Schwab (1991). They inves-
tigate ex post asymmetric information with respect to the degree of risk
aversion in the utility function and identify the following trade-off that the
authority faces when evaluating the tax-revenue maximizing probability of
an anticipated amnesty:8 If the probability of an amnesty increases, the op-
tion value of an amnesty for the violators increases as well, because with
some probability, the evader will learn that he has a high degree of risk aver-
sion such that he prefers the amnesty instead of the (uncertain) monitoring
of the tax authority in the future. This will ceteris paribus decrease tax
revenue. On the other hand, the insurance effect of a tax amnesty ceteris
paribus increases tax revenue. Typically, an interior solution for the proba-
bility of introducing a tax amnesty arises. Andreoni (1991) derives a similar
result. In his model, tax evaders realize a shock in consumption after they
have submitted their report. If a tax evader’s utility function has absolute
decreasing degree of risk-aversion, those evader’s who suffered a sufficiently
negative shock will come forward. Again, there is a trade-off between the
option value of such a scheme and the insurance effect of a tax-amnesty.
Besides, there are two more recent contributions dealing with a welfare
analysis of the option value brought about by ex post asymmetric informa-
tion. In Marceau and Mongrain (2000), tax payers differ with respect to
their benefits from tax evasion. After the tax offense, a violator gets some
new information regarding the benefit which either remains constant or is
reduced. Hence, in this model, ex post asymmetric information refers to the
benefit from tax evasion. All individuals with high ex post utility will not
self-report (otherwise they wouldn’t have violated at all), while tax evaders
with reduced ex post utility will come forward whenever their benefit is suffi-
ciently small. The authority’s effort captured by the detection probability is
exogenously given. Under these circumstances, the authors show that there
exists an interior solution for the self-reporting fine in the sense that it is
7This will be discussed in detail using the models in chapter 4,5 and 7.
8Note that a probability for a (full) amnesty comes close to a certain, but partial fine
reduction.
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lower than the maximum feasible fine which will always be imposed for those
tax evaders who do not self-report. Furthermore, it is shown that, for any
detection probability given, the frequency of violation is higher if there is an
opportunity to self-report. This result is precisely due to the option value
of self-reporting that arises whenever individuals get a signal after having
committed a crime - since a tax evader will only come forward if this leads
to a lower expected payment, the expected fine must also be smaller ex ante.
Feess and Heesen (2002) translate this trade-off into a setting where indi-
viduals get a private up-date about their detection probability. In this con-
tribution, fine-reductions for self-reporters again provide an option value (as
violators with a high detection probability would already come forward after
they received the up-date but without any fine-reduction). However, if one
assumes that a self-reporting violator does not need to be investigated (see
KS 1994) there is an advantage from self-reporting as well. In this framework
it can be shown that marginal self-reporting (i.e. a self-reporting fine that is
infinitesimally below the expected fine for the violator with the highest de-
tection probability) will unambiguously increase social welfare because cost
savings are substantial while deterrence is (almost) preserved. Conversely
to Marceau and Mongrain (2000), Feess and Heesen (2002) also derive the
authority’s optimal monitoring effort. This allows to demonstrate that a
self-reporting scheme is socially beneficial even if it must be ensured that the
incentive to violate a law is not higher than without self-reporting (which
clearly requires a higher monitoring effort due to the option value of self-
reporting), thereby accounting for the main concern of legal scholars against
self-reporting schemes. However, they also show that a self-reporting scheme
that is designed under the restriction that the violation frequency must not
be above the one without fine reductions can generally only be second best.
In our discussion of tax-amnesties we have concentrated on revision amnesties
where a tax evader is allowed to correct his tax declaration. Indeed, this is
also the main focus of the literature. However, such an amnesty can be dis-
tinguished from investigation amnesties where a tax evader is allowed to pay
a fixed amount of money and the authority commits itself not to investigate
this individual for a certain period of time, and from prosecution amnesties
where the authority grants fine-reductions for detected tax-evaders in order
to save litigation costs. Franzoni (1996) shows that the former dominates
the latter with respect to social welfare because of the insurance effect of
an investigation amnesty. This shows some resemblance to the question of
fine-reductions before or after detection that we will discuss in detail in the
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fifth chapter.
Summing up, the literature on self-reporting for the single violator case
has identified many important reasons why reduced fines for self-reporting
individuals should be part of the optimal law enforcement policy. The main
problem with fine reductions is that they ceteris paribus enhance the violation
incentive by creating an option value due to the fact that individuals will
only come forward if they benefit from doing so. This drawback can only be
analyzed economically in a model with ex post asymmetric information. But
even then, the literature has shown that the benefits dominate whenever the
self-reporting scheme is optimally adjusted.
Multiple Violator Case
The most prominent examples for criminal teams are corruption and orga-
nized crime. The theoretical literature on law enforcement against criminal
teams consists of three branches. First, corruptive activity typically needs
a certain hierarchical environment to grow and survive. The development
of hierarchies that fight against corruption is discussed e.g. in Bac (1996).
Second, as public procurement is a major source of income for organized
crime (see e.g. Anderson (1995) who analyzes the income structure of the
Italian mafia) collusion-proof mechanism design (as discussed in Clark and
Riiss (2000)) seems to be an appropriate tool against organized crime. Third,
self-reporting schemes as discussed in the single violator case can be used to
exploit the strategic interaction between team members. Since the litera-
ture review is mainly supposed to prepare our own contributions discussed
in chapters 6 and 7, we restrict our attention to the self-reporting literature.
The most important difference between the single violator case and the
multiple violator case is the following: in the first situation, the expected
fine with self-reporting can never be above the one without fine reductions
for self-reporting individuals if the authority’s monitoring effort is the same.
This follows simply from the fact that (risk aversion excluded) a violator will
never come forward if this increases his expected fine. In fact, as has been
explained in our review of Feess and Heesen (2002), this implies that the
incentive to violate will always be higher with self-reporting if there is some
kind of ex post asymmetric information. This situation changes drastically if
criminal teams are considered. Then, the strategic interdependence between
two or more violators can be exploited to increase the expected fine of each
violator even if the monitoring probability decreases. The idea is closely
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related to the Prisoner’s Dilemma - since each participant of a criminal team
knows that his risk of being convicted increases if his accomplice confesses,
he may have an incentive to confess, too. Hence, it may be an equilibrium
that all team members try to be the first one to self-report, although all of
them could be better off if they were able to credibly commit that no one
of them self-reports. Clearly, the original Prisoner’s Dilemma refers to the
situations where the violators have already been detected, but the basic idea
should carry over to the pre-detection stage under certain circumstances.
This is exactly the idea of a race to the courtroom that has been discussed in
our literature review with respect to corporate leniency programs. We will
elaborate on this idea in the model presented in chapter 6.9
Surprisingly, the literature on self-reporting has only quite recently been
extended to criminal teams. In fact, we are only aware of three papers. Motta
and Polo (1999) analyze an infinitely repeated collusion game where a number
of individuals form a cartel. They consider the impact of the introduction
of a self-reporting opportunity for criminals that have been detected and are
willing to cooperate with the authority to convict the other cartel members.
They show that as long as expected fines for cartel members that refuse
to cooperate are higher than fines for reporting violators (irrespective of
the other cartel members’ behavior), it is clearly a dominant strategy to
cooperate such that a Prisoner’s Dilemma is established. They show that
if the authority has a fixed budget that can be used either to detect or to
convict cartel members, it is welfare enhancing to introduce a Prisoner’s
Dilemma after the detection of a (potential) cartel and before the authority
spends effort in its conviction. As everyone cooperates in equilibrium, the
budget can be saved to detect new cartels, such that deterrence increases.
Clearly, any opportunity to self-report for cartel members that have not been
detected has no impact in this framework as individuals decide upon collusion
and cooperation with the authority in the same information set. From this
Motta and Polo (1999) conclude that it is useless to grant fine reductions for
self-reporting cartel members that are not yet detected.
These results are partly criticized by Spagnolo (2000). He considers the
different impact of moderate fine reductions (up to full immunity) and neg-
ative fines (subsidies) for self-reporting cartel members. His main finding is
that extremely high fine reductions up to subsidies may be required to deter
9In a different context, Kofman and Lawaree (1996) have exploitet this simple idea to
avoid collusive behavior between different auditors.
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cartel behavior. More specifically, he argues that the authority may have to
promise to pay all of the (expected) future profits of collusive behavior to
the first one who self-reports. Thereby, the authority can always establish
a race to the courtroom. Such a kind of self-reporting scheme will always
be welfare enhancing even if the payments to the firm lead to high shadow
costs of public funds, since in the subgame perfect equilibrium firms will not
agree upon collusive behavior at all. Hence, if cartel activity reduces the sum
of consumer’s and producer’s surplus, the mechanism suggested in Spagnolo
(2000) will always be welfare-improving.
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001) extend the analysis to sequential moves
in corruptive activities which seems to be important from a practical point
of view. The nice idea of the paper is that, if the collusive activity requires
sequential actions, small fine reductions may even be counter-productive as
they provide a commitment device for the enforcement of illegal contracts.
Suppose, for example, procurement with a first price auction. A collusive
agreement would be the promise of all competitors to submit a small bid
such that the briber can win the auction by infinitesimally overbidding the
other participants. This agreement given, every competitor has an incentive
to deviate. Therefore, collusive agreements are relatively costly to enforce in
such an environment. But if the authority grants a fine reduction for self-
reporting of collusive behavior, the briber has a credible threat to enforce the
agreement as he can commit to cooperate with the authority if a competitor
deviates. However, as in Spagnolo (2000), it is clear that the authority can
exclude any kind of cooperation by offering high enough subsidies for the
first self-reporter.
The idea of the latter two articles is both amazingly simple and politi-
cally powerful as the suggestion seems to destroy any incentive for founding
criminal teams at virtually no cost where the ”no cost” result arises from the
fact that criminal behavior will not arise along the equilibrium path. There-
fore one is left with two possibilities - one has to demand that such a policy
being implemented, or one has to search for drawbacks in the structure of the
model. We believe that the most simplifying (and worrisome) assumption
is that - analogously to the basic model by Kaplow and Shavell (1994) for
the single violator case - all criminal teams self-report in equilibrium, since
all of them face the same expected fine. This artificially excludes the option
value of self-reporting and therefore neglects the most import drawback of
such an enforcement scheme. Hence, the main idea of our own analysis of
self-reporting schemes for criminal teams is again based on the idea of ex
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post asymmetric information (see chapter 7).
3.3 Literature on Plea Bargaining
Single Violator Case
As described in section 3.1, the literature on plea bargaining deals with the
negotiations between a prosecutor an a defendant after the defendant has
been arrested. Since the (expected) outcome of the negotiations will be
anticipated by a potential defendant, the process of plea bargaining will also
clearly effect the incentive to violate a law. The higher the fine reduction
offered by a prosecutor, the higher the probability that an offer is accepted
which in turn leads to lower costs of litigation. But on the other hand, the
higher the fine reduction, the lower is the expected fine ex ante, and the
higher is the crime rate. Hence, the literature on plea bargaining analyzes
the trade-off between litigation expenditures and deterrence.
This trade-off has been analyzed in the seminal paper by Landes (1971),
where the prosecutor maximizes the number of convictions subject to a bud-
get constraint. He can spend his money either on evidence collection or on
litigation. However, all defendants are assumed to be guilty, so that the pros-
ecutor gets no additional information on the defendant’s type through the
negotiations (evidence collection only increases the probability that criminals
that are known to be guilty can actually be convicted).
To the best of our knowledge, the first game theoretical model on plea
bargaining was developed by Grossman and Katz (1983) where a percentage
α of the defendants is guilty while 1 − α are innocent. They construct a
perfectly separating equilibrium in which all guilty defendants accept the
offer while all of the innocent ones refuse. Hence, the model is the first
one that explicitly considers plea bargaining as a screening device. The
conclusion, however, that plea bargaining is a perfect screening device is
neither convincing from a practical nor from a theoretical point of view.
Theoretically, the result that all guilty defendants accept the offer requires
that there is a probability that cases are brought to court if an offer is refused
- but since only innocent defendants do not settle, it is not really convincing
that the prosecutor commits on bringing cases to court (in fact, this can only
establish a subgame perfect equilibrium if litigation costs are small), and
equilibria in mixed strategies seem to be more appropriate for the problem
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at hand.
A step in this direction is undertaken by Reinganum (1988) who assumes
that the prosecutor has no full discretion, meaning that he is legally re-
stricted in the offers he is allowed to make. Furthermore, she assumes that
the prosecutor has also private information with respect to the strength of
the case, so that this seems to be the first model analyzing double-sided
asymmetric information in the context of plea bargaining. As in Grossman
and Katz (1983), an unwarranted feature of the model is that only innocent
defendants are brought to trial since all guilty defendants accept the offer in
equilibrium. This problem is solved by Baker and Mezzetti (2001) who es-
tablish a semi-separating equilibrium in which all innocent, but also some of
the guilty defendants refuse the offer. This leads to the plausible conclusion
that both innocent and guilty defendants are brought to court.
Recent interesting extensions focus on situations where different regula-
tive agencies have different objective functions. For instance, Miceli (1996)
assumes that the legislature aims at maximizing deterrence, and therefore
wants to reduce the prosecutor’s discretion as plea bargaining reduces the
expected fine and leads to a higher criminal rate. Reinganum (2000) ex-
plains why a sentencing commission that can reduce the prosecutor’s dis-
cretion may wish to implement a different plea bargaining offer than the
prosecutor even though the objective functions are essentially identical. The
reason is that the sentencing commission knows only the ex ante distribution
over the defendants, whereas the prosecutor has case specific information.
Since different plea offers may be optimal at different times according to the
different information settings, a conflict between the sentencing commission
and the prosecutor may arise. From a theoretical point of view, the ques-
tion is whether ex ante commitment is socially beneficial or not. On the
one hand, ex ante commitment allows to be tough in the sense that ex post
efficient fine reductions will not be granted which enhances deterrence, while
on the other hand useful information is then neglected in the offer such that
litigation costs increase. This question is closely related to the distinction
between the self-reporting literature and the plea bargaining literature since
the self-reporting literature always assumes that the authority commits to
grant pre-specified fine reductions ex ante.10
10As in the model of Daughety and Reinganum (1994) discussed in the settlement-
literature below, Reinganum (2000) considers both screening games (where the prosecutor
makes the offer) and signaling games (where the informed defendant makes the offer). Of
course, screening games are more closely related to our context of self-reporting.
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Multiple Violator Case
We are only aware of two papers dealing with multiple defendants in the
context of plea bargaining. The paper by Kobayashi (1992) is closely related
to our model developed in chapter 6. Whereas the literature with single de-
fendants as described in the former section focuses on the trade-off between
deterrence and litigation expenditures, Kobayashi (1992) notes that plea bar-
gaining with two defendants can be exploited to increase the expected fine
by reducing actual fines for those defendants who can provide useful evidence
on their accomplices. Hence, the strategic interdependence between the two
defendants overcomes the trade-off between deterrence and expenditures -
it is possible to save litigation costs and to increase deterrence at the same
time. The basic idea is closely related to the classical prisoner’s dilemma
because a fine reduction is offered for a confessing defendant if and only if
he provides information that leads to a sufficiently high increase in the prob-
ability that the partner can be convicted (in the prisoner’s dilemma, this
probability is equal to one). A more important distinction to the prisoner’s
dilemma is that the fine can not be made dependent on the behavior of the
accomplice, i.e. the prosecutor must make unconditional offers. It can easily
be seen that this reduces the deterrence effect because it does not become a
dominant strategy to confess if the fine is only infinitesimally smaller than
the maximum fine. Nevertheless, as in our papers described in chapter 6
and 7, the strategic interdependence can be exploited to implement higher
expected fines. This given, the author provides an argument why leaders of
criminal teams often face lower equilibrium fines than those members who
bear lower responsibility - the reason is simply that ”project leaders” often
possess superior information, and reducing their fines is therefore suited to
convict the whole team. In this sense, an interesting trade-off between effi-
ciency and justice arises. We will analyze this in detail within the model in
chapter 6.
To contribute to this conflict between efficiency and justice, Garoupa
(1999) models the strategic interaction between members of a criminal team
in a more explicit way. He focuses on organized crime where an organization
(i.e. its leader) offers a franchise contract to an individual. The organization
decides upon the number of members and upon the level of investment into
the criminal ”know how”. The more people are members of the organiza-
tion, the higher is the probability of detection. The higher investment, the
more sophisticated the organization operates and, consequently, the smaller
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is the probability of detection. If the authority allows for plea bargaining, a
member can get full (or partial) immunity if he provides information about
the organization that leads to a conviction of the leader. Ceteris paribus this
leads to increasing incentives to become a member of the organization, as
expected fines are reduced. The organization, however, will offer a smaller
amount of franchise contracts as more members increase the probability of
self-reporting and consequently conviction. Therefore, the opportunity of
plea bargaining may be an incentive to become a member of an organization,
but organizations will be smaller in equilibrium. If in addition investments
into criminal ”know how” increase the probability that a report of a mem-
ber leads to conviction (because the members have to do more sophisticated
jobs that require more knowledge about the organization, for instance), plea
bargaining not only reduces the average equilibrium size of the firm but
also weakens its internal organization which results in enhanced social wel-
fare. Note that, as opposed to Kabayashi (1992), Garoupa (1999) derives
an asymmetric treatment of leaders and other members of the organization
that grants no fine-reduction for the leader, which is a direct consequence of
modelling organized crime as a franchise relationship.
3.4 Literature on Settlements
Single Violator Case
The natural starting point of the settlement literature is why cases go to
trial at all.11 Given that litigation is costly, both parties could benefit in
expectation from settling the case, so that one could be tempted to predict
that all cases should be settled in equilibrium. In other words, the first
question is why the Coase Theorem is often violated so that out-of-court
settlements are not always reached.12 The ”old” literature, often referred to
as the ”settlement range-literature” or the ”exogenous beliefs-literature” that
has originally been developed by Landes (1971) and Posner (1973), simply
assumes that the plaintiff and the defendant have different beliefs upon their
winning probability. Given that the plaintiff assumes that he prevails in court
with probability p, whereas the defendant assumes that the plaintiff wins only
11The following presentation is close to Kaplow and Shavell (1999), p. 48ff.
12In the US, however, about 96% of federal civil cases are resolved without trial, see e.g.
Ostrom and Kauder (1996).
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with q < p, a case will be litigated whenever p − q is high compared to the
parties’ litigation costs. The advantage of the settlement range-literature is
that it allows to analyze the impact of some basic exogenous variables (beliefs,
litigation costs, different degrees of risk aversion and rules for the allocation
of litigation costs) in a very simple manner. Given the fact that lawyers are
typically advising both litigants, this helps to explain why the settlement
frequency is extraordinarily high at least in the US - the overoptimism bias
may be mitigated by the experts’ advises, litigation costs are substantial, and
the impact of risk aversion seems to be high at least in private litigations.
Furthermore, the literature allows to analyze under which circumstances the
American rule of allocating litigation costs (each party pays its own litigation
costs except in cases where the court concludes that the suit was frivolous
in the sense that the winning probability was extremely low right from the
beginning) or the English rule (which is also applied in Germany and which
means that the loser pays for the winner’s litigation costs up to a reasonable
amount) leads to a higher settlement frequency. Moreover, the overoptimism
bias seems to be quite plausible from a practical point of view.13
Not withstanding these advantages, the old literature is unsatisfactory
from a game theoretical point of view as the beliefs are exogenously given
and not endogenously derived from different information settings. Further-
more, the bargaining process leading to a settlement is not modelled explicitly
- it is simply assumed that a settlement is reached whenever the difference
between the expected aggregated benefit from litigation is below total lit-
igation costs.14 If asymmetric information is factored into the analysis, it
is quite natural that some cases go to trial why others are settled. In the
seminal paper by Bebchuk (1984), for instance, it is assumed that only the
defendant has private information and that the plaintiff makes a take-it-or-
leave-it-offer to the defendant. The plaintiff then faces the usual trade-off
arising in bargaining models with asymmetric information - if he demands
a high compensation, he will benefit if the defendant accepts the offer, but
the probability that the defendant accepts the offer decreases in the required
amount. Hence, in equilibrium, defendants with high probabilities of prevail-
ing in court will refuse the offer while other types will accept.
By now, there are many extensions of the basic model capturing more
13See e.g. Lowenstein et al. (1993) and Mnookin (1993).
14Recall that the expected aggregated benefit is not zero even though the game at hand
is in fact a zero-sum game. But since both parties are overoptimistic, their aggregated
expected benefits are positive.
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elaborated kinds of asymmetric information as well as more sophisticated
bargaining procedures. Whereas the basic model of Bebchuk (1984) can be
interpreted as a screening model since the uninformed party makes the take-
it-or-leave-it-offer, Reinganum andWilde (1986) develop a signaling model by
assuming that the informed party makes the offer. The next kind of extension
was introduced by Schweitzer (1989) and Daughety and Reinganum (1994)
who consider models of double-sided asymmetric information. An important
generalization of the previously distinctive screening- and signaling-parts of
the settlement literature is provided by Daughety and Reinganum (1994) who
assume that the two parties can decide themselves whether to make an offer
or not. In other words, the question whether a signaling- or a screening-game
arises is endogenized.
While other extensions like sequential offers as considered by Spier (1992)
actually lead back to the general non-cooperative bargaining-literature, there
are also many extensions that are more closely related to the question of
bargaining in the shadow of the court. Spier (1994) analyzes the impact of
fee-shifting rules (i.e. the question under which circumstances the loser pays
total litigation costs even under the American rule), and Miller (1998) ex-
tends to the case where litigation costs are endogenous in the sense that they
depend on the time that is exerted for information gathering. Furthermore,
although it is often taken for granted that a high settlement frequency is so-
cially desirable, the difference between the private and the social incentives
to settle have not been modelled explicitly for a long time. Spier (1997) and
Shavell (1999) partially fill this gap by arguing that there may also be neg-
ative effects from settlements arising from the fact that settlements reduce
the parties expected payments, and thereby the costs from engaging in risky
activities. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Daughety and Reinganum
(1999), if a case is litigated, it is more likely that other (potential) plaintiffs
become informed about the case which may increase their incentive to sue
and thereby enhances deterrence. In fact, the incentive of a defendant to
settle should be the higher the higher the probability that new plaintiffs are
attracted if the case goes to court.
Summing up, the settlement-literature with asymmetric information in
the single-violator case is related to the self-reporting models developed be-
low in the sense that, in equilibrium, not all individuals will settle. In our
context, this is comparable to the result that, with ex post asymmetric in-
formation, only individuals with high probabilities of apprehension will self-
report. However, the focus of the settlement-literature is on the impact of
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different information settings on different bargaining games under different
legal rules, whereas our models in the single-violator case investigate the
impact of such settings on a law enforcement scheme that allows for take-it-
or-leave-it offers and is ex-ante designed by the authority.
Multiple Violator Case
As described above, there are only very few models dealing with the multi-
ple violator case in the self-reporting- and in the plea bargaining-literature.
Conversely, the settlement-literature on multi-defendant lawsuits has already
started in the end of the 80th and has developed many variants within the
last years. From a practical point of view, a reason for an early development
of the literature seems to be that multi-defendant settlements play an impor-
tant role in the U.S. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) where multiple parties are hold jointly and sev-
erally liable for the clean-up costs of contaminated landfills, for instance.
Starting with the seminal article by Kornhauser and Revesz (1989), the
literature has focused on the impact of different liability and settlement rules
on the incentive of the parties involved to agree to settlements. The dif-
ference between several liability only on the one hand and joint and several
liability on the other hand is whether a party A, say, has to pay for an other
party’s, B, say, liability share if party B becomes insolvent (see Kornhauser
and Revesz (1994a), (1994b)). In our context, the impact of different settle-
ment rules is more interesting as it leads to different strategic interactions in
the parties’ behavior. In the US, two main settlement rules are predominant:
Under the so-called pro tanto rule, a non-settling party pays the difference
between total damages and the other party’s settlement. Conversely, under
the so-called proportionate rule, each party is liable for her original share
independently of whether the other party settled or not. Within the class
of pro-tanto rules, a second important distinction refers to conditional and
unconditional rules.15 Under the unconditional rule16, each defendant’s pay-
ment is independent of whether a settling party would have been liable or
not. Under the conditional rule, a set-off is only granted if the settling party
would have been liable. The surprisingly high interest of economists in set-
tlement rules in recent years can mainly be explained by the fact that the
15Klerman, Settling Multi-defendant Lawsuits, supra note 1, p. 447.
16Note that unconditional proportionate rules would not make sense as a ”proportion-
ate” liability depends on whether the other party is liable or not by definition.
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U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 replaced the uncon-
ditional pro-tanto rule with the proportionate rule to reduce accountant’s
settlement payments that were judged as being excessively high.17 Note that
in Germany, only the proportionate rule is applied.
Almost all papers analyzing the impact of settlement rules on the equilib-
rium payments and the settlement frequency with multiple defendants have
restricted their attention to the case with symmetric information with respect
to the probabilities of being held liable in court. Under these circumstances,
the main result is that unconditional set-off rules discourage settlements if
the probabilities of prevailing against both defendants are uncorrelated.18
This is due to the possibility of receiving a set-off even in cases where a
settling party is non-liable. It follows that the maximum settlement a defen-
dant is willing to accept is lower than the plaintiff’s expected reward from
litigation, so that the plaintiff prefers to directly litigate if litigation costs
are sufficiently low. The problem disappears if conditional set-off rules are
applied instead.19 Hence, the literature argues that the unconditional pro-
tanto rule that is widely adopted in the US is strictly inferior with respect
to the settlement frequency.
However, as Feess and Mu¨hlheußer (2000) have demonstrated, this con-
clusion is no longer valid if asymmetric information with the probability of
being held liable is factored into the analysis. To capture the problem of
asymmetric information as easy as possible, they assume that there are two
defendants with two types each: a ”bad” type, certainly found liable, and
a ”good” type who is liable with a probability below one. Whereas each
defendant knows his own type, the plaintiff (and the other defendant) only
know the probability of meeting a good or a bad type. They show that, de-
pending on the litigations costs, each of the three rules may then lead to the
highest settlement probability which contradicts the findings from the per-
fect information case. As under perfect information, it is possible that the
proportionate rule is superior because the plaintiff never prefers to directly
17However, a non-settling party’s payment is restricted to the minimum of her original
share and the difference between total harm and the other party’s settlement; see e.g.
King and Schwartz (1997).
18See Kornhauser and Revesz (1994a,b), Klerman (1996) and Boyd, Holloway et al.
(1998) for an analysis of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
19Conversely, the unconditional pro tanto set-off rule leads to a total settlement amount
above the plaintiff’s expected recovery from litigation if the probabilities are perfectly
correlated; see Kornhauser and Revesz (1994), Spier (1994) and Kahan (1996).
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litigate both defendants. But on the other hand, there are plausible con-
stellations where the settlement offers, and hence the frequency of rejection,
are lowest under the unconditional pro tanto rule. This leads to a higher
quota of rejections, and thus to a higher percentage of cases going to trial.
A similar result holds for the comparison between the conditional and the
unconditional pro tanto set-off rules.
Summing up, the settlement-literature with multiple defendants is related
to our models with criminal teams described in chapters 6 and 7, respec-
tively, in the sense that the decision whether to accept a settlement offer or
not depends on the counterpart’s type. Specifically, the incentive to accept
an offer under the pro-tanto rule ceteris paribus increases in the probabil-
ity that the partner himself accepts the offer (which can be described as a
reaction curve in a continuous setting; see Feess and Gleave (2001)). This
has some similarities to the fact that, in the models developed above, the
incentive to self-report increases if the partner can provide a higher amount
of evidence which leads to a higher probability of being detected and con-
victed without having self-reported. However, the strategic interaction is
more complicated in the settlement-literature as the main objective is the
comparison between different institutional settings (especially between the
pro tanto- and the proportionate rule). Hence, the settlement-literature on
multi-defendant lawsuits with asymmetric information has not dealt with the
deterrence effects of the different rules yet.
3.5 Conclusions
The review of the legal situation and the theoretical literature shows a certain
tension between legal practice and theoretical investigations. We identify the
following open questions:
(i) As soon as ex post asymmetric information induces an option value
of self-reporting, a welfare analysis shows the superiority of marginal self-
reporting independently of the distribution of asymmetric information. This
does not seem to be of prime importance for legal scholars who decide upon
substantial fine-reductions. Can we identify simple characteristics of the
distribution that determine the amount of these finite fine-reductions? This
question is analyzed in the model described in chapter 4.
(ii) In legal practice, individuals typically have two opportunities to self-
report - before or after a detection. We are only aware of the model by Motta
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and Polo (1999) that treats multiple self-reporting decisions. Does their
irrelevance result for the first self-reporting stage survive in the presence of
ex post asymmetric information? What is the relationship between optimal
fines on the first and the second self-reporting stage? This is discussed in
chapter 5.
(iii) The most simple law enforcement against criminal teams seems to be
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. In chapter 6, we exploit the idea of driving the mem-
bers of a cartel into a Prisoner’s Dilemma even if the violation has not been
detected yet, and we investigate the drawbacks of such a law enforcement.
(iv) Finally, are these investigations of ex post asymmetric information,
multiple self-reporting stages and strategic interactions among members of
criminal teams of any help when analyzing the differences of leniency pro-
grams of cartel prosecution in the EU and the US? This question motivates
the analysis in chapter 7.
Chapter 4
Heterogeneity and
Self-Reporting
4.1 Introduction
In the following we will present a model that analyzes the impact of ex
post asymmetric information with respect to the heterogeneity of criminals
(i.e. their probabilities of detection) on the optimal self-reporting scheme.
Consider a violator who will only come forward if he realize after the violation
that his individual detection risk (his ”type”) exceeds a critical threshold.
The possibility of self-reporting then leads to an option value, and thereby
increases ceteris paribus the violation frequency.
This given, we derive two results: first, we show that at least some self-
reporting is nevertheless socially optimal. However, existence results are
only of minor importance when designing self-reporting schemes in reality.
To derive at least tentative legal conclusions, we therefore analyze the im-
pact of heterogeneity on the optimal regime. We show that the optimal fine
reduction decreases in the degree of heterogeneity if the criminals’ types are
uniformly distributed. For general distribution functions, however, we iden-
tify different countervailing effects, and we explain when the optimal fine
reduction increases in the degree of heterogeneity.
To avoid shortcomings, let us emphasize that one has to be careful when
thinking about the relevance and the degree of ex post asymmetric infor-
mation in reality. A tax evader or a manager engaged in illegal collusive
behavior, for instance, will only self-report if they learn that the authority
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focuses on their kind of illegal activity. However, even though a violator then
gets important new information, this information is due to the authority’s
own behavior, and can therefore be taken into account when deciding upon
the fine reduction. This is important, since neglecting ex post optimal fine
adjustments1 requires not only new information, but also that the informa-
tion is divided in an asymmetric way. Otherwise, the authority can account
for the new information when deciding upon the fine reduction case by case.
Ex post asymmetric information seems to be plausible when considering a
robber who realizes that he has left footprints when he buried the money, for
instance. At least when he self-reports early enough, the authority will not
find out about his sloppiness. More generally, the criminal’s estimation of his
own cleverness will change after having committed a crime, and the authority
will not investigate how many mistakes the self-reporting criminal may have
realized before he confessed without having been detected yet. Summing up,
the higher the impact of the authority’s behavior on the new information,
the lower seems to be the relevant degree of heterogeneity of types.
In section 4.2, we introduce the model. Section 4.3 derives the optimal
self-reporting scheme for a given degree of heterogeneity. Section 4.4 analyzes
the impact of heterogeneity. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
In our model, risk-neutral individuals decide on violating a law. Violation
causes harm h. Individuals’ benefits b from violation differ and are dis-
tributed between [0, b] with continuous density f(b) and cumulative distri-
bution F (b). b is private information. The authority investigates a certain
fraction of all individuals who do not self-report a crime. This fraction is
denoted p, and each case investigated causes constant costs of c.
After having committed a crime and before deciding upon self-reporting,
individuals receive private signals θ on their individual detection probabilities
if their case is investigated. The overall probability of being detected is thus
given by pθ. θ is distributed on [0, 1] with density g(θ) and cumulative distri-
bution G(θ). The degree of ex post asymmetric information (heterogeneity)
will be measured by the standard deviation σ(θ).
1This might be seen as a distinctive feature between the self-reporting literature (see
below) on the one hand and the literature on plea bargaining (see e.g. Reinganum (2000)
as a recent contribution) on the other hand.
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If a violator is detected without having self-reported, then the maximum
fine s will be imposed.2 The fine for self-reporting individuals may be lower
and is denoted by r ≤ s. The timing is as follows:
- Stage 1 Authority decides upon p and r.
- Stage 2 Individuals learn b and decide upon violation.
- Stage 3 Violators learn θ and decide upon self-reporting.
- Stage 4 Non-reporting violators are detected with θp.
4.3 Analysis for a given Degree of Hetero-
geneity
In this section, we derive the optimal policy for a given distribution of θ. We
solve the game qua backwards induction and start with stage 3. A violator
will self-report if r ≤ pθs. Thus, the borderline type θ˜ who only just self-
reports is given by
θ˜ =
r
ps
. (4.1)
Initially, a potential violator knows that he will pay r whenever his de-
tection type is weakly above θ˜, and s with probability pθ if his type is below
θ˜. It follows that the expected fine φ when deciding upon violation in stage
2 is given by
φ =
∫ 1
θ˜
g(θ)dθr +
∫ θ˜
0
pθg(θ)dθs. (4.2)
All types with individual detection probabilities above θ˜ will self-report
and face fine r. This explains the first term in Eqn. (2). All types below θ˜ will
take the risk of being caught and pay expected fine
∫ θ˜
0
pθg(θ)dθs. Defining b˜
as the borderline type for violation and pi(p, r) ≡ pi as the violation frequency,
we get
pi =
∫ b
b˜=φ
f(b)db. (4.3)
2This is clearly optimal as it is a simple application of the result of Becker (1968) that
has been discussed in chapter 3.
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Defining λ(p, r) ≡ λ = ∫ 1
θ˜
g(θ)dθ as the percentage of violators who self-
report a crime, social costs are given by
SC = pih+ cp (1− piλ)−
∫ b
b˜
bf(b)db. (4.4)
First, all violators (pi) cause harm h regardless of whether they self-report
or not. Second, a percentage p of all individuals who do not self-report is
investigated, and each case has constant costs of c. Since piλ individuals
self-report, a fraction of 1− piλ is investigated. The third term measures the
benefit of the violators. The authority chooses p and r as to minimize social
costs, so that the optimal values p∗ and r∗ are implicitly given by3
∂SC
∂p
=
∂pi
∂p
h− cppi∂λ
∂p
− cp∂pi
∂p
λ+ b˜f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂p
+ c(1− piλ) = 0 (4.5)
∂SC
∂r
=
∂pi
∂r
h− cppi∂λ
∂r
− cp∂pi
∂r
λ+ b˜f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂r
= 0. (4.6)
The first order condition for p∗ consists of five parts: the first part is
the expected reduction in damages caused by a marginal increase in p. The
second benefit from higher p is that the number of self-reporters increases
in p, thereby reducing investigation costs. The next two parts express the
disadvantages of self-reporting: More individuals need to be investigated if
less individuals violate since only violators can self-report (part 3), and the
expected benefit from violation decreases (part 4). Part 5 displays marginal
investigation costs. The different parts in the first order condition for r can
be explained analogously.
From the first order condition for r∗, we get
Proposition 4.1. r∗ ∈ [0, ps).
All proofs are in the Appendix.
The upper bound for r∗ expresses that social costs can always be re-
duced by marginal self-reporting. For an intuition, recall that marginal costs
∂SC
∂r
capture two effects: First, as r decreases, the self-reporting frequency
3The sufficient conditions for r∗ and p∗ and explicit calculations of the following ex-
pressions are in the Appendix.
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increases. This leads to cost savings of picp per additional self-reporter inde-
pendent of the number of self-reporters. Second, any decrease in r reduces
expected fines, but only for those who self-report (such that the marginal
number of violators is given by ∂b˜
∂r
= λ). It follows that the second effect
vanishes for λ→ 0, while the first one survives.
4.4 The Impact of Heterogeneity
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of the heterogeneity of types, mea-
sured by the standard deviation σ of the distribution function g(θ), on the
optimal regime. As a preliminary intuition, one might think that the optimal
fine reduction should be decreasing in the standard deviation σ (dr
∗
dσ
> 0),
because the option value of self-reporting is increasing in the degree of un-
certainty. However, this is only correct for special cases as there are many
countervailing effects at work. Understanding these countervailing effects
and drawing some tentative conclusions is the objective of this section. When
considering our general model where not only the self-reporting fine r but
also the monitoring frequency p is optimally adjusted, we get4
dr∗
dσ
= −
∂2SC
∂p2
∂2SC
∂r∂σ
− ∂2SC
∂p∂r
∂2SC
∂p∂σ
detH
. (4.7)
Since many parts turn out to be ambiguous in sign in the general case (see
Appendix), dr
∗
dσ
is ambiguous, too. To sharpen the intuition for the different
effects, we proceed in the following steps: First, we consider a simplification
of our general model where p is exogenously given, and where the criminals’
benefit b is neglected in the social cost function (illicit crimes). We show
that the intuition described above (dr
∗
dσ
> 0) then holds for the uniform
distribution of the violators’ types θ, but not for the normal distribution.
For the normal distribution, however, we are able to describe precisely the
different countervailing effects at work.
Second, we consider non-illicit crimes by introducing b as part of the social
cost function, and third we perform the analysis for optimally adjusted p.
For both extensions, we prove that the result dr
∗
dσ
> 0 nevertheless holds for
the uniform distribution (of course, dr
∗
dσ
is again ambiguous for the normal
distribution). Throughout, we assume that b is uniformly distributed on
4H is the Hesse Matrix.
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[0, b], since the sign of contributions proportional to f ′(˜b) otherwise depends
on b˜ itself. Then, any increase in expected fines caused by higher p or higher
r may result in a reduction of marginal deterrence if f ′(˜b) < 0. This leads to
additional countervailing effects driving the analysis much more cumbersome
and less transparent.
Illicit crimes with p exogenously given.
With p exogenously given, we have dr
∗
dσ
= − ∂
2SC
∂r∂σ
∂2SC
∂r2
. Since ∂
2SC
∂r2
> 0 is required
for an interior solution, we have dr
∗
dσ
> 0 if and only if ∂
2SC
∂r∂σ
< 0. Let us start
with the case of illicit crimes by neglecting the benefit b in the social cost
function. Defining A ≡ −cp∂λ
∂r
pi and B ≡ ∂pi
∂r
(h− cpλ), we can then write
∂2SC
∂r∂σ
=
∂A
∂σ
+
∂B
∂σ
(4.8)
where
∂A
∂σ
= −cp
(
∂2λ
∂r∂σ
pi +
∂λ
∂r
∂pi
∂σ
)
= cp
∂g(θ˜)
∂σ
1
ps
− g(θ˜)
bps
∂b˜
∂σ
) (4.9)
and
∂B
∂σ
=
∂2pi
∂r∂σ
(h− cpλ)− ∂pi
∂r
cp
∂λ
∂σ
=
∂λ
∂σ
1
b
(2cpλ− h). (4.10)
A captures the marginal benefit of self-reporting. For a given violation
frequency pi, any decrease in r increases the number of self-reporters, and
therefore reduces investigation costs cppi. The impact of heterogeneity on
A is twofold. First, σ changes the marginal number of self-reporters that is
effected by a change in r ( ∂
2λ
∂r∂σ
= −∂g(θ˜)
∂σ
1
ps
). If the density decreases in σ
at the borderline type θ˜, then the marginal number of self-reporters that is
effected by a fine reduction is reduced. But this means that the marginal
benefit of such a fine reduction is reduced as well, which would imply ∂A
∂σ
< 0
if this were the only effect at work. Second, any increase in the heterogeneity
changes the violation frequency (∂pi
∂σ
) and hence modifies the marginal benefit
of a fine reduction as well.
B expresses the marginal costs of self-reporting due to the option value of
lowering r captured by ∂pi
∂r
< 0, weighted with h− cpλ, because the positive
effect that investigation costs can be saved must be subtracted from harm
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h. Again, there are two effects of a change in σ. First, any change in σ
effects the marginal number of violators ( ∂
2pi
∂r∂σ
= −∂λ
∂σ
1
b
). Second, σ changes
the number of self-reporters, and thus the marginal costs associated with
the option value of self-reporting (∂pi
∂r
cp∂λ
∂σ
). In the Appendix, we show that
(2cpλ − h) < 0 for a uniform distribution. This result does not generalize
to other distributions (depending on their slope ∂g(θ)
∂θ
) as long as h < 2c.
Furthermore, the sign of ∂B
∂σ
depends on whether the heterogeneity reduces
the number of self-reporters itself, i.e. ∂λ
∂σ
.
To summarize, dr
∗
dσ
depends on the sign and the magnitude of the marginal
number of self-reporters ( ∂g(θ˜)
∂σ
), the change in the violation-frequency (∂pi
∂σ
),
the change in the self-reporting frequency (∂λ
∂σ
), and the slope of the distribu-
tion ∂g(θ)
∂θ
together with the relative magnitude of h and c. To further analyze
the impact of these terms and to pin down both their sign and their relative
importance, we have to specify g(θ).
Uniform distribution. As for this, we start with uniform distributed
types and assume that θ is distributed between
[
1
2
− a, 1
2
+ a
]
with a ∈ [0, 1
2
]
.
Hence, the higher a, the higher σ. For ease of exposition, we perform the
analysis direct with respect to a instead of σ.5 We then get a clear result:
Result 4.1. Suppose p is exogenously given, θ is uniformly distributed, and
crime is illicit. Then, dr
∗
da
≥ 0.
Result 4.1 shows that, in the case considered, the optimal fine reduction
is indeed decreasing in the degree of heterogeneity. For an intuition, we have
to consider A and B separately. First, we find that ∂A
∂a
< 0, i.e. the benefit
from lowering r is strictly decreasing in a.
First note from figure 1 that ∂g(θ˜)
∂a
< 0 for uniform distributions, so that
the marginal number of self-reporters (∂λ
∂r
) decreases in a. This contributes to
∂A
∂a
< 0 (and hence to dr
∗
da
> 0). But on the other hand, ∂pi
∂a
> 0 as the option
value of self-reporting increases in the degree of heterogeneity. This induces
a higher violation rate and increases marginal benefits of a fine reduction
such that ceteris paribus ∂A
∂a
> 0 and dr
da
< 0, respectively. Nevertheless, we
show in the Appendix that the ”direct” effect via self-reporting dominates
the ”indirect” effect via violation, such that indeed ∂A
∂a
< 0.
5Clearly, this has no impact on the results as dr
∗
dσ =
dr∗
da
da
dσ =
√
3dr
∗
da .
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However, ∂B
∂a
is ambiguous and somewhat more subtle. Recall that B
captures the marginal costs of fine reductions due to a higher violation in-
centive. First of all, (2cpλ − h) < 0 as shown in the Appendix, such that
the sign of ∂B
∂a
is identical to the sign of −∂λ
∂a
, i.e. to the marginal impact of
the heterogeneity on the self-reporting incentive. The reason why ∂λ
∂a
- and
hence ∂B
∂a
- is ambiguous even for uniform distributions of θ can best be ex-
plained with figure 4.2. For our uniform distribution, we have λ =
(
1
2
+a−θ˜
2a
)
,
∂λ
∂a
= 1
4
−1+2θ˜
a2
, and hence ∂λ
∂a
> 0 if and only if θ˜ > 1
2
.
For θ˜ = 1
2
, λ is independently of a given by λ = 1
2
, and ∂λ
∂a
= 0. But if we
are to the right of 1
2
(i.e. if θ˜ > 1
2
), then Figure 4.2 shows that the number of
self-reporters is strictly increasing in a, because the reduction of the density
is relatively unimportant as it is only relevant for a small interval in θ. In
other words, the number of people affected is decreasing in θ˜. For θ˜ < 1
2
, the
reduction of the density is relevant for more than half of the population, and
consequently more important.
Taking ∂A
∂a
and ∂B
∂a
together, it follows that the counter-intuitive result
dr∗
da
< 0 can only arise if θ˜ < 0.5 (and hence ∂B
∂a
> 0) and if ∂B
∂a
dominates.
However, as stated in Result 4.1, ∂B
∂a
> 0 cannot dominate. To see this, recall
that ∂B
∂a
> 0 requires θ˜ < 0.5, meaning that more than half of the violators
self-report. But this enlarges the marginal benefit of a fine reduction captured
by A (i.e. it increases
∣∣∂A
∂a
∣∣) so that ∂B
∂a
can only be positive if
∣∣∂A
∂a
∣∣ is large
(and thus tends to dominate). Our results can be summarized as follows.
∂A
∂a
∂B
∂a
dr∗
da
θ˜ ∈ [1
2
− a, 1
2
) < 0 > 0 > 0
θ˜ = 1
2
< 0 = 0 > 0
θ˜ ∈ (1
2
, 1
2
+ a] < 0 < 0 > 0
Normal distribution. We now analyze whether our result carries over to
more general distributions of θ. As we will see, considering a normal dis-
tribution will be sufficient to identify the countervailing effects leading to
an ambiguous overall result. For the normal distribution, we have g(θ) =
1√
2piσ
e−
( θ−12 )
2
σ2 . Then, we get ∂λ
∂σ
= 0 if θ˜ ∈ {0, 1
2
, 1
}
and ∂λ
∂σ
< (>)0 if
θ˜ < 1
2
(
θ˜ > 1
2
)
as illustrated in Figure 4.3 below. In contrast to the limited
support of the uniform distribution, the support of the normal distribution
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remains to be the entire unit interval such that full (no) self-reporting cor-
responds to r = 0 (r = ps). In these limit cases, σ will obviously have no
impact on the number of self-reporters. The same holds for r = ps
2
as all
normal distributions are symmetric with respect to their mean values. Like
for the uniform distribution, the number of self-reporters again decreases (in-
creases) in the degree of heterogeneity if r < (>)ps
2
, because an integration
from θ˜ < (>)1
2
to 1 puts less (more) weight on contributions at high (low)
distance to the mean value.
Conversely to uniform distributions, ∂A
∂σ
is now ambiguous since the den-
sity at θ˜ depends not only on σ, but also on θ˜ itself. The marginal number
of self-reporters decreases in σ if θ˜ is sufficiently close to 1
2
, while it increases
in σ if θ˜ is at a sufficient distance to the mean value (see Figure 4.3). This
leads to the result that ∂A
∂σ
is ambiguous in sign. Furthermore, ∂B
∂σ
is again
ambiguous in sign as ∂λ
∂σ
< (>)0 if θ˜ < (>)1
2
. In addition, it is no longer
guaranteed that (2cpλ− h) < 0 (see Eqn. (A.14)).
Nevertheless we are able to derive unique results for the comparative
statics with respect to the heterogeneity measured by σ for certain values
of θ˜. Although θ˜ is endogenous, it is correct to directly argue with respect
to θ˜ since we show in the Appendix that dr
∗
dh
> 0 for fixed p such that the
optimization program provides a surjective mapping r∗(h) : < → [0, ps).
Hence, for any r ∈ [0, ps) (and every θ˜ ∈ [0, 1)), we can always find a h such
that indeed r∗(h) = r.
Result 4.2. Suppose p is exogenously given, θ is normally distributed, and
crime is illicit. Then, dr
∗
dσ
R 0. A sufficient condition for dr∗
dσ
< 0 is that
θ˜ → 1 together with σ → 0. A sufficient condition for dr∗
dσ
> 0 is that θ˜ → 1
2
.
To demonstrate that the special case with (almost) no self-reporting (θ˜ →
1) is not a necessary condition to get the counter-intuitive result dr
∗
dσ
< 0, we
provide in the next table numeric simulations leading to different signs of dr
∗
dσ
with r∗ ∈ (0, ps) (and thus with 0 < θ˜ < 1).
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σ p · s c b h r∗ dr∗
dσ
0.05 0.01 · 10, 000 80 1,000 5 38.5
0.07 0.01 · 10, 000 80 1,000 5 34.5 < 0
0.05 0.01 · 10, 000 80 1,000 50 45.5
0.07 0.01 · 10, 000 80 1,000 50 45.8 > 0
0.05 0.01 · 10, 000 80 1,000 200 53.8
0.06 0.01 · 10, 000 80 1,000 200 56.5 > 0
This table depicts the changes in r∗ when σ raises from 0.05 to 0.07
as a function of h (and hence for different r∗). For low h’s, the optimal
self-reporting fine is decreasing in the heterogeneity. Formally, this is due to
∂B
∂σ
> 0 for r ≤ ps
2
as ∂λ
∂σ
< 0 and (2cpλ−h) < 0, and ∂A
∂σ
> 0 because ∂g(θ)
∂σ
> 0
in this case. For an intuition, recall that the impact of fine reductions on the
benefit from self-reporting increases in the marginal number of self-reporters.
The more violators are effected by a fine-reduction (such that they decide
to self-report), the more people need not to be examined. On the other
hand, the impact of a fine-reduction on the costs decreases in the marginal
number of violators (which is proportional to the number of self-reporters).
For low h (and hence for high fine-reductions in equilibrium) the marginal
number of self-reporters increases indeed in the degree of heterogeneity 6 (as
∂2λ
∂r∂σ
= −∂g(θ˜)
∂σ
1
ps
< 0) whereas the marginal number of violators decreases
(as ∂λ
∂σ
< 0). Therefore, marginal benefits of a fine reduction increase while
marginal costs are reduced in the degree of heterogeneity. Both facts together
lead to dr
∗
dσ
< 0. For large h (and hence for large r∗) the first effect remains
unchanged, but marginal costs increase as well because ∂λ
∂σ
> 0 in this case,
such that it is more likely to find the counter-intuitive result for small h
(and small r∗). To summarize, the intuitive result that the self-reporting fine
increases in the heterogeneity carries only over to normal distributions if h
is neither too high nor too low.
Non-illicit crimes with p exogenously given
We now turn to non-illicit crimes, meaning that we include the benefits b
in the social cost function when deriving r∗. Since we have already shown
that dr
∗
dσ
is ambiguous for normally distributed types even when neglecting b,
it is straightforward that it is ambiguous for non-illicit crimes, too.7 Hence,
6Recall that this was impossible for a uniform distribution.
7Examples available on request.
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we only analyze whether the impact of σ on r∗ is still clear-cut for uniform
distributions. When r is reduced, the borderline type who only just violates
decreases such that more people violate. This results in an additional term
given by D ≡ b˜f (˜b) ∂b˜
∂r
= b˜λ
b
in the social cost function. Hence, we get8
∂2SC
∂r∂a
=
∂A
∂a
+
∂B
∂a
+
∂D
∂a
(4.11)
with
∂D
∂a
=
∂b˜
∂a
f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂r
+ b˜f (˜b)
∂2b˜
∂r∂a
=
∂b˜
∂a
f (˜b)λ+ b˜f (˜b)
∂λ
∂a
. (4.12)
In ∂D
∂a
, the first term captures the impact of a on the marginal benefit
from a higher crime rate, while the second term displays the impact of a on
the change of the crime rate. As above, ∂b˜
∂a
< 0 for uniformly distributed
types, such that the first term will be negative for the following reason: if
the heterogeneity increases, then the incentive to violate increases as well.
But this means that the borderline type b˜, and hence the marginal benefit
from violation, decreases. Note that this further contributes to dr
∗
da
> 0.
Whereas ∂b˜
∂a
f (˜b)λ measures the impact on b˜ for λ given, the second term
captures the impact of a on λ itself. Recall from the former subsection that
∂λ
∂a
> 0 iff θ˜ > 1
2
. For θ˜ > 1
2
, a higher heterogeneity enhances the impact of the
self-reporting fine r on the borderline type b˜, which means that the marginal
benefit from violations increases. This contributes to dr
∗
da
< 0, because higher
heterogeneity makes a fine reduction more attractive when the criminals’
benefit is considered as being socially valuable. Although the different parts
of ∂D
∂a
are therefore ambiguous in sign, we can show the following result.
Result 4.3. Suppose p is exogenously given, θ is uniformly distributed, and
crime is non-illicit. Then, dr
∗
da
≥ 0.
Formally, the reason for Result 3 is that ∂
2b˜
∂r∂a
b˜f (˜b) > 0 requires θ˜ > 1
2
, but
in this case ∂B
∂a
< 0 which ceteris paribus supports dr
∗
da
> 0. Hence, ∂D
∂a
and ∂B
∂a
are countervailing effects, and it turns out that the former never dominates
the latter. Intuitively, ∂
2b˜
∂r∂a
b˜f (˜b) could only dominate if the impact of a on
the benefit of the violators were more important than the impact on social
8Since we consider only uniform distributions in this subsection, we directly use ”a”
for the degree of heterogeneity again.
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harm. However, this is not possible in an interior optimum by definition of
optimality, since it can not be an equilibrium that the authority discourages
a crime for which the benefit is above the level of harm. Hence, the result
holds for uniform distributions regardless of whether we consider illicit or
non-illicit crimes.
Illicit crimes with p optimally adjusted
Next, we take into account that p can be optimally adjusted. Again, we
can safely restrict our attention to uniform distributions. According to Eqn.
(4.7) the analysis is more tedious since ∂
2SC
∂r∂p
and ∂
2SC
∂p∂σ
do not disappear.9
Let us define ∂
2SC
∂r∂σ
as the direct effect, and ∂
2SC
∂r∂p
+ ∂
2SC
∂p∂σ
as the indirect effect,
respectively. We have already discussed the unique sign of the direct effect.
Furthermore, we show in the Appendix that the indirect effect is in general
ambiguous in sign. The indirect effect supports the counter-intuitive result
dr∗
da
< 0 e.g. if the optimal self-reporting fine r∗ increases in p, and if the
optimal p∗ decreases in a.10 This can indeed be the case as less individuals
are affected by an increase in p if the heterogeneity is high.11 Nevertheless,
our monotonicity result also carries over to this case since the direct effect
discussed in the previous subsections always dominates. This gives us
Result 4.4. Suppose p is endogenous, θ is uniformly distributed, and crime
is illicit. Then, dr
∗
da
≥ 0.
Intuitively, the indirect effect cannot dominate because of the following
reason: Recall from the previous sections that the direct effect is particularly
small if r is small (as in this case marginal benefits decrease in a (∂A
∂a
< 0)
while marginal costs increase (∂B
∂a
> 0). But for small r, most of the people
self-report such that the impact of p on social costs is small as only few people
are affected. This reduces the magnitude of the indirect effect.
Finally, note that we have not considered the case with non-illicit crimes
and endogenous p simultaneously. The reason is as follows. λ =
∫ (1/2+a)ps
θ˜=r/ps
1
2a
dθ
is linear in r, and b˜ = λr +
∫ θ˜=r/ps
(1/2−a)ps
1
2a
dθps (and pi as well) are quadratic
9The two terms are analyzed in the Appendix. Note that an interior solution ensures
that ∂
2SC
∂p2 > 0.
10Of course, r∗ and p∗ are derived simultaneously, so that a ”change of r∗ in p” is not
well-defined, but this kind of ”separation” sharpens the intuition.
11In the Appendix we provide an example that exhibits this feature.
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functions of r. But this implies that SC is cubic in r if crime is illicit (because
of cpλpi), and even fourth order if crime is non-illicit (because of
∫ b
b˜
bf(b)db).
The latter case considerably complicates the numeric analysis as closed form
solutions to the system of first order equations are no longer computable with
standard routines.
4.5 Discussion
We have considered a model of optimal self-reporting where violators are
heterogenous with respect to their probabilities of apprehension. Since these
probabilities are private information and are learned after the violation, they
lead to an option value of self-reporting, and thereby ceteris paribus to a
higher violation frequency. Nevertheless, we have demonstrated the optimal-
ity of marginal self-reporting.
With respect to the impact of heterogeneity, we have shown that the in-
tuitive result that the optimal fine reduction is lower when the option value
from self-reporting increases due to a higher heterogeneity holds if the detec-
tion types are uniformly distributed regardless of the role of private benefits
or an endogenized monitoring frequency. However, for other distributions,
there are additional effects coming from the fact that the density (and hence
the number of individuals affected) depends on θ˜ itself. This drives all re-
sults ambiguous - for instance, if the number of violators that are indifferent
between self-reporting or not increases in the degree of heterogeneity, a fine
reduction becomes more beneficial when the heterogeneity is high.
With respect to the relevance of ex post asymmetric information, the
crucial point is that the authority can adjust its policy if the new information
depends on its own behavior. For instance, a full amnesty for tax evaders
will not be granted when the authority already presumes that a violation
has taken place, and the same holds for corporate leniency programs. Hence,
low self-reporting fines seem indeed appropriate in these fields of application
since the option value of new information is low in the authority’s optimal
policy. In cases of common crimes like robbery or theft, new information that
is not brought about by the authority’s behavior will presumably be more
important because the violator will often reconsider the cleverness of his
behavior ex post, thereby learning his specific detection probability which is
(mainly) independent of the authority’s behavior. This may at least partially
explain why fine reductions are usually lower for these kinds of crimes.
Chapter 5
Multiple Stages and Option
Values
5.1 Introduction
To contribute to the ongoing discussion among legal scholars (see chapter
2) wether fine-reductions for self-reporting criminals should be granted be-
fore and/or after they have been detected by the authority, we consider two
self-reporting stages now. First, a criminal may self-report before his case is
detected. Second, he can self-report if he is detected but not yet convicted.
In both stages, we assume that individuals get private signals on their ac-
tual probabilities of detection and conviction, respectively. Of course, the
possibility to self-report even if one is already investigated not only enhances
the incentive for crime, but also reduces the incentive to report early in the
game. Note that analyzing the impact of two self-reporting stages makes
only sense in the presence asymmetric information (and hence different in-
dividuals), since otherwise all violators would clearly self-report in the first
stage in the authority’s optimal policy anyway.
In our model, we first show that the option value ceteris paribus leads to
higher a violation frequency. Nevertheless, granting fine reductions in both
stages is socially optimal, and the authority can always induce the same
violation frequency at lower costs by adjusting its effort accordingly. Fur-
thermore, we analyze the relationship between the different policy variables
(for instance, is the self-reporting fine in the last stage increasing or decreas-
ing in the authority’s effort in the first stage?) by applying the concept of
47
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strategic substitutes and strategic complements. Finally, we analyze how
the optimal fine reduction in the second self-reporting stage reacts on the
harm reduction caused by reporting in this stage. These questions seem to
be important when designing self-reporting schemes in reality.
In section 5.2, we introduce the model. As a benchmark, we start with
the optimal policy without self-reporting in section 5.3. Section 5.4 derives
the optimal self-reporting scheme. Section 5.5 analyzes the impact of harm
differences on the optimal difference in self-reporting fines. Section 5.6 con-
cludes.
5.2 The Model
As in the previous chapter, risk-neutral individuals decide upon violating a
law. Violation causes harm h1 if it is self-reported before the case is investi-
gated, harm h2 > h1 if it is self-reported when the case is detected, and harm
h3 > h2 if it is not self-reported at all. The advantage of an early detection
is immediate in cases like environmental harm or competition offenses, but
may also be interpreted in the sense that the authority gets evidence which
leads to the conviction of accomplices.1 Individuals differ with respect to
their benefits b from violation, where b ∈ [0, b] is private information, and is
distributed with positive, continuous density f(b). Individuals learn b (and
the authority’s policy) before they decide upon violation.
A key aspect of our model is the distinction between a detection proba-
bility P1 and a conviction probability P2. P1 depends on two variables: on
the authority’s effort p1 ∈ (0, 1), and on individual attributes θ1 of a violator.
p1 can also be interpreted as the fraction of cases investigated. Investigation
costs are C1(p1), with C
′
1(p1) > 0, C
′′
1 (p1) > 0, and lim
p1→1
C ′1(p1) = ∞, lim
p1→0
C ′1(p1) = 0. After having committed a crime, violators get uncorrelated pri-
vate signals θ1 on their types, where θ1 ∈ [0, 1] is distributed with density
g1(θ1). The individual probability of being detected then depends on the
fraction of cases investigated (p1) and on individual attributes, and is thus
given by P1 = p1θ1.
2 Note that θ1 is learned after the violation, thereby
1In contrast to the previous chapter we neglect the KS 1994- advantage that self-
reporting violators need not to be examined. Instead, we follow the idea introduced in
Innes (1999). This allows us to perform more transparent comparative statics. Clearly, a
second advantage would only reinforce our results.
2One could also say that p1 is the investigation probability, and θ1 the (individual)
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creating an option value.
The fine the authority can impose is again bounded above by s. After
having violated, the individual receives his private signal θ1 and may self-
report his violation before the case is investigated. Then, a self-reporting
fine r1 ≤ s is imposed. If so, the game ends, and harm is h1.
If not, the case is detected with probability P1. Otherwise, the game ends
and harm is h3. When the case is detected and brought to court, this does
not necessarily mean that the violator is actually found guilty and convicted.
Instead - and analogous to detection - the conviction probability P2 = θ2p2
depends on both, the authority’s effort denoted p2 and on individual at-
tributes denoted θ2. θ2 ∈ [0, 1] is learned after the case has been detected
and is distributed with g2(θ2). The authority’s costs are C2(p2).
3
After having learned θ2, the violator again decides upon self-reporting. If
so, fine r2 ≤ s is imposed, the game ends, and harm is h2. Otherwise, harm
is h3, regardless of whether the criminal is convicted or not. Summing up,
the timing is as follows:
- Stage 1 Authority commits to its policy vector Γ ≡ (p1, p2, r1, r2).
- Stage 2 Individuals learn b. Violation decision.
- Stage 3 Violators learn θ1. Self-reporting decision (fine r1).
If so, game ends. Harm h1.
- Stage 4 If not, cases are detected with θ1p1.
- Stage 5 If so, detected violators learn θ2. Self-reporting decision (fine r2).
If so, game ends. Harm h2.
- Stage 6 If not, conviction with probability θ2p2 (fine s). Harm h3.
5.3 No Fine Reduction
As a benchmark, let us first exclude fine reductions for self-reporting. Then,
we can start in stage 2. Expected fine φ is
φ =
(∫ 1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1p1
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2p2
)
s, (5.1)
detection probability if the case is investigated. What matters is that the case is brought
to court with probability p1θ1.
3C2(p2) has similar features as C1(p1). Total effort costs are C(p1, p2) = C1(p1) +
C2(p2).
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since one must be detected and convicted to pay the maximum fine s. As
individuals violate whenever their benefit from violation is weakly above the
expected fine, the borderline type b˜ who only just violates is
b˜(Γ) ≡ b˜ = φ. (5.2)
The authority chooses p1 and p2 to minimize social costs
SC =
∫ b
b˜
f(b)dbh3 + C1(p1) + C2(p2). (5.3)
Proposition 5.1. The authority’s optimal policy solves the first order con-
ditions
C ′1(p1) = h3f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂p1
(5.4)
C ′2(p2) = h3f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂p2
(5.5)
Proof. Follows directly form minimizing SC. ¥
The first order conditions express that marginal investigation costs (C ′i(pi))
must equal the marginal reduction in harm (h3) caused by the lower violation
frequency from a higher borderline type (f(b˜) ∂b˜
∂pi
).
5.4 Fine Reductions
In the following we allow for fine reductions in stages 3 and/or 5. We start
in stage 5 when individuals decide upon self-reporting if the case has been
detected. Since individuals have already learned θ2, they will self-report if
r2 ≤ θ2p2s. It follows that the borderline type who only just self-reports is
θ˜2 =
r2
p2 · s. (5.6)
In stage 3, violators have learned θ1 but not yet θ2, which means that
they do not know if they will self-report if stage 5 is reached. Define φ as
the expected fine if one does not self-report in stage 3:
φ =
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2r2 +
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2p2f2(θ2)dθ2s. (5.7)
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Note that the possibility to self-report in stage 5 reduces φ due to the
option value, because violators will self-report in stage 5 if and only if they
(weakly) benefit from doing so. Following the same argument as in stage 5,
the borderline type in stage 3 is
θ˜1 =
r1
p1 · φ , (5.8)
which leads to
Lemma 5.1. (i) The incentive to self-report in stage 3 is increasing in p1,
p2 and r2, and decreasing in r1. With respect to θ˜1, (ii) p2 and r2 are comple-
ments to p1, (iii) p1, p2 are substitutes to r1, (iv) r1 and r2 are substitutes,
(v) p2 and r2 can either be substitutes or complements.
All remaining proofs are in the Appendix.
Part (i) shows that granting fine reductions even if the case is already
detected reduces the incentive to self-report earlier in the game. As to part
(ii), by complements with respect to θ˜1, we mean that the impact of p1 -
for instance - on the incentive to self-report in stage 3 is increasing in p2(
∂2θ˜1
∂p1∂p2
> 0
)
. This comes from the fact that individuals do not care about
being detected if their conviction probability when being brought to court is
low anyway. Hence, increasing p1 is the more valuable the higher p2, and vice
versa. The same holds for the connection between pi ∀i and r2 for similar
reasons. Also intuitive, p1 and p2 are substitutes to r1, since the marginal
impact of pi ∀i on θ˜1 decreases if r1 increases as most individuals will not
self-report anyway.4
The connections between the policy parameters in stages 5 and 3 with
respect to θ˜1, however, are more subtle. To see that r1 and r2 are substitutes
(part iv), suppose that r2 is so low that postponing the self-reporting decision
to stage 5 is a tempting alternative. Then, even small increases in r1 will
lead to significantly less self-reporting in stage 3. Hence, the lower r2, the
higher the marginal impact of changes in r1, implying that the two fines are
substitutes. With respect to p2 and r2 (part v) the following counter-veiling
effects are at work: On the one hand, r2 and p2 are substitutes with respect
to θ˜2. As the expected fine φ increases in θ˜2, r2 and p2 tend to be substitutes
4Formally, this means that ∂
2θ˜1
∂r1∂pi
< 0 ∀i.
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with respect to θ˜1 as well. On the other hand, any increase in r2 or p2 yields
higher an expected fine φ, which leads to a complementary impact.
In stage 2, when individuals decide upon violation, they know that they
will self-report whenever their probability of being caught is above θ˜1. Fur-
thermore they calculate their expected fine without self-reporting in stage 3
by taking the option value of self-reporting in stage 5 into account (as ex-
pressed in φ). It follows that the borderline type b˜ who only just violates
is
b˜ =
∫ 1
θ˜1
g1(θ1)dθ1r1 +
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1p1φ, (5.9)
where θ˜1 is given by Eqn. (5.8) and φ is given by Eqn. (5.7).
Lemma 5.2. (i) The incentive to violate is decreasing in p1, p2, r1 and
r2. With respect to the borderline type who only just violates (˜b) , (ii) r1
is a complement to p1, p2 and r2, (iii) all other combinations can either be
substitutes or complements.
Part (i) is again straightforward. To see why r1 is a complement to the
three other policy variables, note that the marginal impact of r1 on the
violation incentive (hence on b˜) is increasing in θ˜1. And as shown in Lemma
5.1, θ˜1 is indeed increasing in p1, p2 and r2. As to part (iii), note again that
any increase in r2 and p2 reduces the marginal impact of p1 as it enhances
self-reporting in stage 3. On the other hand, expected fines in stage 5 increase
in p2 and r2, what leads to higher an impact of p1. The marginal impacts of
p2 and r2 are also ambiguous because of the counter-veiling effects in stages
3 and 5.
To derive the authority’s optimal policy in stage 1, let us define λi ≡∫ 1
θ˜i
gi(θi)dθi and pi ≡
∫ b
b˜
f(b)db as the self-reporting and violation frequencies,
respectively. Then, social costs are
SC = pi (λ1h1 + (1− λ1)λ2h2 + (1− λ1)(1− λ2)h3) + C1(p1) + C2(p2).
(5.10)
In the authority’s optimal policy that minimizes social costs the following
result holds:
Proposition 5.2. In the authority’s optimal policy, the set of self-reporters
is non-empty both in stages 3 and 5.
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Proposition 5.2 states that, even if the option value of self-reporting is
taken seriously by allowing for ex post-updates in both stages, it is optimal
to grant fine reductions in both self-reporting stages. Note that there are
two negative effects from fine reductions: first, both fine reductions lead to
higher violation incentives due to the option value. Second, the fine reduction
in stage 5 reduces the incentive to self-report early in the game, which leads
more often to harm h2 instead of h1. To see that fine reductions in both stages
are nevertheless superior, suppose that r2 is so high that only violators with
very high θ2’s will self-report.
5 Then, the option value from stage 5 becomes
arbitrarily small. On the other hand, the reduction in social costs is still
relevant due to h3 > h2. This explains why at least little self-reporting in
both stages is superior.6 Note that Proposition 5.2 implies that r2 > r1,
because the set of self-reporters in stage 3 would otherwise be empty due to
the option value.
Although social costs are lower in the optimal self-reporting scheme than
in the scheme considered in the previous section by definition of optimality,
the violation frequency may be higher. Recall that a sufficient condition for
this to occur is pi ≤ pnsi ∀i7, since the option value ceteris paribus increases
the incentive to violate the law. Hence, such a regime may be criticized at
least from a legal point of view. Therefore, we add the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.1. For each system without fine reductions, there always exists
a scheme with a non-empty set of self-reporters in both stages that leads to
the same violation frequency, and to lower social costs.
Corollary 5.1 is a straightforward implication of Proposition 5.2. If the
fine-reduction becomes small, the option value tends to zero, while the benefit
from self-reporting remains positive. Of course, such a scheme is usually not
the optimal one - ensuring a non-increasing crime rate leads to higher total
social costs. Defining SCs as the minimum social costs when the violation
frequency must not be above the one without self-reporting, we thus have
SC ≤ SCs < SCns. (5.11)
5A similar argument holds for stage 3.
6Note that this is similar to the result in chapter 4 where marginal self-reporting was
optimal due to the KS 1994 advantage of self-reporting.
7The superscript ns denotes the case with no self-reporting.
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5.5 Harm Dependence of Fine Reductions
To characterize the optimal self-reporting scheme we now investigate how
a higher harm if one self-reports only after the case is detected (h2, that
is) influences the optimal fine on the second self-reporting stage (r2). This
question is interesting for legal practice, since the benefit from self-reporting
after detection will vary considerably from case to case. For some kind of
environmental harm, for instance, early self-reporting may be required to
prevent that damages escalate. Furthermore, self-reporting may also lead to
detection of accomplices which offers an other, and often more important,
interpretation of h3 − h2. Finally, self-reporting is socially warranted as it
reduces errors in court.
Intuitively, one would think that dr2
dh2
> 0 in the authority’s optimal policy,
because self-reporting in the second stage becomes less valuable if h2 increases
(for h1 and h3 given). Since the deterrence effect of higher r2 remains the
same, this should lead to higher an r2 when h2 increases. However, things
are somewhat more complicated as h2 also affects the optimal choice of r1,
and thereby indirectly the optimal r2.
To make our points and to describe the counter-veiling effects, it is suffi-
cient to use a simplified version by treating p ≡ (p1, p2) as given. This may
be acceptable in many cases at least in the short run, since the resources of
the police department or the prosecutor are limited. Furthermore, we assume
that both b and θ are uniformly distributed on [0, 1].8 Then, the comparative
statics reveals the following result.
Proposition 5.3. dr2
dh2
> 0 if and only if ∂
2SC
∂r21
∂2SC
∂r2∂h2
− ∂2SC
∂r1∂h2
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
< 0 where
∂2SC
∂r21
∂2SC
∂r2∂h2
< 0 and ∂
2SC
∂r1∂h2
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
Q 0 if b and θi are uniformly distributed on
[0, 1].
∂2SC
∂r21
∂2SC
∂r2∂h2
captures the direct impact of h2 on the optimal r2, whereas
∂2SC
∂r1∂h2
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
measures the indirect effect via r1. Let us start with the direct
effect. Proposition 5.3 says that ∂
2SC
∂r21
∂2SC
∂r2∂h2
< 0, so that the first term goes in
the expected direction (i.e. leads to an increase of r2 in h2).
∂2SC
∂r21
is positive
due to the fact that the choice of r1 is a well-defined optimization problem
8Again, this is sufficient for the points we want to make. Without these assumptions,
the expressions derived from the comparative statics are hardly tractable as might have
been illustrated by the model in the previous chapter.
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for uniformly distributed benefits. Furthermore, ∂
2SC
∂r2∂h2
< 0, which expresses
that the marginal impact of h2 on social costs is decreasing in r2. To see
this, note that the number of self-reporters in stage 5 is decreasing in r2.
But this means that h2 occurs the less often, the higher r2, which explains
that ∂
2SC
∂r2∂h2
< 0.
However, the second term in Proposition 5.3 is ambiguous. In fact, both
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
and ∂
2SC
∂r1∂h2
can be either positive or negative, so that the product alone
would yield dr2
dh2
< 0 if the signs of the two terms were different. The first
term ( ∂
2SC
∂r1∂h2
) measures the marginal impact of h2 on the marginal effect of
r1 on SC
9 and can be written as10
∂2SC
∂r1∂h2
= λ2
(
∂pi
∂r1
(1− λ1)− pi∂λ1
∂r1
)
. (5.12)
Note that ∂
2SC
∂r1∂h2
> 0 would imply dr1
dh2
< 0 if this were the only effect at
work. The higher (1−λ1), the higher the percentage of violators that reaches
stage 2. If both (1−λ1) and
∣∣∣ ∂pi∂r1 ∣∣∣ are high,11 then lowering r1 leads to a high
fraction of individuals reaching stage 5. And since this is unwarranted if h2
increases, the incentive to choose higher r1 if h2 increases is itself increasing
in
∣∣∣ ∂pi∂r1 (1− λ1)∣∣∣. On the other hand, if ∣∣∣∂λ1∂r1 pi∣∣∣ is high, then the self-reporting
frequency is heavily reduced in stage 1 if r1 increases, and many individuals
will reach stage 2 since the violation frequency is high. Then, it would ceteris
paribus be better to reduce r1. Hence,
dr1
dh2
> 0 ( dr1
dh2
< 0) if the first (second)
effect dominates.
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
captures the marginal impact of r1 on the marginal impact of r2 on
social costs SC. Again, there are countervailing effects. On the one hand,
r2 becomes less important if r1 increases, because the number of violators is
lower anyway. If this effect dominates, we have ∂
2SC
∂r2∂r1
< 0 (hence dr2
dr1
> 0).
On the other hand, the higher r1, the higher the percentage of violators which
reaches stage 5, and which should be motivated to self-report at least in stage
5. Hence, self-reporting in stage 5 becomes more important, and this leads
ceteris paribus to dr2
dr1
< 0.
We can now explain why the indirect effect goes in the unexpected di-
rection if the signs of ∂
2SC
∂r1∂h2
and ∂
2SC
∂r2∂r1
are different. Suppose first that
9Analogously to ∂
2SC
∂r2∂h2
above.
10See Appendix.
11Recall that ∂pi∂r1 < 0.
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∂2SC
∂r1∂h2
< 0. This means that r1 increases in h2 because the authority wants
to induce higher deterrence at the expense of lower self-reporting in stage 3.
But then, if ∂
2SC
∂r2∂r1
> 0, r2 is decreasing in r1. Economically, this means that
the authority reduces r2 to avoid that those who have violated even though
the deterrence effect is high due to a high r1, but have not self-reported in
stage 1 (again due to a high r1) will not self-report at all, and will thus cause
harm h3. Hence, the indirect effect captured by
∂2SC
∂r1∂h2
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
leads ceteris
paribus to dr2
dh2
< 0, because r1 is increasing in h2, and r2 is decreasing in
r1. The opposite effect can be explained analogously. Hence, without further
assumptions, we cannot exclude that the authority should reduce r2 if h2
increases because the (paradoxical) indirect effect dominates.
5.6 Discussion
Several conclusions can be drawn from this model. We have shown that
fine reductions should be granted before and after the case is detected. In
a continuous framework, this means that the maximum fine should only be
imposed if there are no benefits from self-reporting at all. This holds even if
one realistically assumes that the violation incentive ceteris paribus increases
with self-reporting due to the option value. This option value arises only
with ex post asymmetric information which was thus assumed with respect
to detection and with respect to conviction. It follows that the authority
must increase its effort if it is not willing to accept more violations. Clearly,
because the up-dated conviction probability is higher if the case is already
detected, the fine reduction should be lower in the second stage. This is usual
practice in court, where an early confession is higher rewarded.
Allowing for fine reductions if the case is detected leads less often to h3,
but more often to harm h2 instead of harm h1, since it decreases the incentive
to self-report early in the game. Hence, it seems clear without saying that
high fine reductions in stage 5 should only be granted if it is important that
the case is detected at all (i.e. if h3 is high, whereas the difference between
h2 and h1 is low). Harm reduction h3 − h2 may not only refer to counter-
measures with respect to the criminal’s own violation, but also to evidence
leading to the conviction of other criminals. This is the basic idea of granting
high fine reductions in leniency programs for competition offenses even if the
case is already under investigation, because it is important to restore the
competitiveness on markets. On the other hand, fine reductions if the case is
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investigated are low for ordinary crimes where the harm done to the victims
can no longer be reduced. In these cases, the deterrence effect is much more
important than the harm reduction effect caused by self-reporting. This is
plausible for tax evasions, and may be a criticism of the German practice to
grant fine reductions for tax evaders even if the case is not investigated yet.
However, our analysis reveals that only the direct effect of h2 on r2 goes in
the expected direction. If r1 is heavily increased as a reaction to higher h2
as to reduce the violation frequency, and if r2 is decreasing in r1, then the
indirect effect may lead to even lower r2.
Furthermore, we have analyzed the connection between the marginal im-
pacts of pi and ri on the self-reporting frequency and the violation frequency,
respectively. Therefore, we adopted the concept of strategic substitutes (com-
plements). For instance, we have shown that r1 is a complement to all other
policy parameters with respect to the border line type who only just vio-
lates.12 This means that, if the authority’s main objective is to reduce the
violation frequency, it does not make sense to exert high effort if r1 is low.
However, this does not hold for r2, since there are countervailing effects of
r2 on the behavior in stages 3 and 5, respectively. These insights are use-
ful when designing the optimal scheme even though many total effects are
ambiguous without further assumptions.
Besides our analysis, additional insights arise if one assumes that the
private benefit from violation (b) is non-sunk. By non-sunk benefits we mean
that a violator’s benefits can be collected by the court if he is convicted. This
becomes interesting if one considers a dynamic version of the game where
benefits are accumulated in time. In our model with ex post asymmetric
information, the incentive to self-report then depends on both b and on θ.
Two additional aspects arise: Individuals will voluntarily quit their criminal
activities after some time, because the opportunity costs from losing the
accumulated benefits are increasing in the number of periods, and this has
a similar effect to higher a maximum fine s. Furthermore, the authority’s
optimal effort changes from period to period, because the optimal p depends
on the (maximum) fine s + Σtb. For the special case where both b and θ
are uniformly distributed, we have shown that the authority’s optimal effort
decreases in time.
12See Lemma 5.2, (ii).
Chapter 6
Law Enforcement for Criminal
Teams
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we extend the analysis of optimal self-reporting schemes to
criminal teams. By criminal teams, we mean that violations take place if two
individuals agree upon. In the self-reporting stage, there is a strategic inter-
action, because each violator must take into account that his accomplice may
cheat on him by self-reporting the criminal act. If the criminals decide sepa-
rately and non-cooperatively upon self-reporting, we show that this strategic
interaction can be exploited to drive them in a prisoner’s dilemma. Recall
that this strategic advantage of self-reporting schemes has nothing to do with
the benefits emphasized in the literature on single violators mentioned above.
Whether the assumption that the two criminals decide non-cooperatively
in the self-reporting stage is realistic or not depends on the situation at
hand. After a bank robbery, criminals may go their own ways and decide
separately upon self-reporting when the authority stays hard on their heels.
If a building contractor bribes a civil servant to win a procurement, however,
cooperative behavior seems to be more realistic. Although the criminals are
unable to sign binding (illegal) contracts, there may be other bonding devices
inducing that they maximize their joint utility in the self-reporting stage.
For instance, a potential self-reporter may fear that his accomplice reports
former violations that have not been detected yet, or he might be afraid of
loosing her reputation within a corruptive sub-society. Finally, he may simply
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care about her partner’s utility. When criminals behave cooperatively, they
actually act in concert and behave like a single violator in KS 1994.
Interesting questions arise when the authority does not know if the crim-
inals act cooperatively or non-cooperatively in the self-reporting stage. We
derive two results: if the probability of cooperative behavior is exogenous,
then the authority can design an optimal self-reporting scheme where non-
cooperative offenders are still driven in a prisoner’s dilemma. Moreover, the
optimal self-reporting scheme is independent of the percentage of cooperative
behavior. The result changes fundamentally if the probability of cooperation
is endogenous. In many circumstances, it seems likely that the cooperation
rate in the self-reporting stage is itself increasing in the expected benefit
from cooperation. For instance, the criminals may search for credible bond-
ing devices ex ante if they anticipate that they otherwise run in a prisoners’
dilemma. Furthermore, they will try to get in contact to avoid the conse-
quences of Nash behavior. Then, we show that it is optimal to grant fine
reductions even if both criminals self-report. Thereby, cooperative behavior
can explain why we do usually not observe maximum fines if both criminals
self-report.
A second fact we account for is that self-reporting technologies are of-
ten imperfect in the sense that a violator cannot certainly be convicted if
his partner self-reports. This offers a second and independent explanation
why the fine if both come forward is below the maximum fine. We demon-
strate that the fine imposed on a self-reporting criminal is increasing in the
probability that he can be convicted if his accomplice self-reports.
6.2 Basic Model
In our model, there are two individuals i = 1, 2 whose private benefits
bi ∈ [0, b] from crime are independently and identically distributed with con-
tinuous density f(bi). bi is private information. Violation causes harm h1 if
it is self-reported, and harm h2 > h1 if it is not self-reported, for instance
because the welfare loss from collusive behavior in markets is the lower the
earlier it is detected. Without loss of generality, we assume that self-reporting
occurs if the criminals are indifferent.
The probability that a criminal team is detected is denoted by P ∈ (0, 1).
P can also be interpreted as the fraction of cases investigated.1 The higher
1One might also imagine that each single violator is detected with probability p, and
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P , the higher the authority’s investigation costs C(P ), where C ′(P ) > 0,
C ′′(P ) > 0, and limC ′(P )P→1 =∞. The maximum fine is denoted s and will
again be imposed for those who are detected without having self-reported.
Defining pi as the probability that a violation takes place, and λ as the
frequency of self-reporting, social costs are
SC = pi (λh1 + (1− λ)h2) + C(P ). (6.1)
The time structure of the game is as follows.
- t1 Authority commits to its policy
- t2 Individuals learn bi
- t3 Individuals decide upon violation
- t4 Violators decide upon self–reporting
Non-cooperative behavior Let us first assume that all violators behave
non-cooperatively in the self-reporting stage. Then, the authority must
choose three variables: (i) the detection probability P , (ii) a fine r for a
single self-reporter, and (iii) a fine l if both self-report. Define the author-
ity’s decision vector as Ω ≡ (r, l, P ).
By backwards induction, we turn to the offenders’ self-reporting decision
first. For any Ω given, the expected fine structure is given as follows.
S N
S l/l r/s
N s/r Ps/Ps
By definition of non-cooperative behavior, each violator minimizes his
own expected fine in the self-reporting stage. Clearly, complete self-reporting
(S/S) is always a Nash equilibrium since l ≤ s by definition of s. A second
Nash equilibrium without self-reporting (N/N) exists if r is sufficiently high,
i.e. if Ps ≤ r. If there are multiple equilibria, we assume throughout that
the criminals play the equilibrium that is favorable to them.2 In the subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) it will turn out that the N/N -equilibrium will not
exist anyway. We find:
that detecting one violator is sufficient to convict both of them. Then, the overall detection
probability P is given by P = 2p− p2.
2This is the assumption most unfavorable for our suggestion, and is hence introduced
to avoid misunderstanding.
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Proposition 6.1. Suppose all criminals behave non-cooperatively in the self-
reporting stage. Then, Ωn = (rn = 0, ln = s− ε, P n = ε).3
Proof. Given Ωn, self-reporting is a dominant strategy as rn < P ns and
ln < s. The expected fine is fn = s − ε, and hence (almost) maximum.
Finally, as C ′(P ) > 0, the minimum P ensuring rn < P ns is chosen. This
requires rn = 0 and P n = ε. ¥
The idea behind Proposition 6.1 is straightforward: By giving a break to
a single self-reporter, but not an appreciable break if both self-report, self-
reporting becomes a dominant strategy even if this leads to the maximum
fine in equilibrium. Hence, maximum deterrence can be reached at almost no
cost by driving the accomplices in a prisoner’s dilemma. As to the violation
decision, this implies that only individuals whose private benefits b are above
s prefer to violate. Taking into account that both individuals must agree
upon violation, the overall violation frequency is pi(Ωn) =
[∫ b
s
f(b)db
]2
, and
hence minimal.
Cooperative behavior We believe that cooperative behavior in the self-
reporting stage is a promising candidate to explain why maximum deterrence
at almost not cost is not feasible in reality. By cooperation, we mean that the
two individuals minimize their joint expected fine when deciding upon self-
reporting.4 We define φi as the expected fine of criminal i, and φ ≡ φ1 + φ2
as the expected joint fine.
We first analyze the authority’s optimal policy if all teams behave coop-
eratively. Afterwards, we turn to the connection between non-cooperative
and cooperative teams in case the authority does not know ex ante which
self-reporting behavior applies.
With cooperation, an additional possibility has to be taken into account,
since the whole team may come forward and confess the criminal act. Define
k as the fine per capita in this case. The authority’s decision vector is then
Ω = (r, l, k, P ). Note the difference between l and k: In both cases, both
criminals self-report. However, they self-report separately in the first case,
whereas they enter the police department as a team in the latter case. The
expected joint fine Φ is
3Superscript n denotes the non-cooperative case.
4Hence, we implicitly allow for side payments.
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Φ =

r + s if exactly one self-reports
2l if both self-report separately
2k if they self-report jointly
2Ps without self-reporting
It follows that the expected equilibrium fine for each of them is5
φci(Ω
c) ≡ φci = min(
r + s
2
, l, k, Ps). (6.2)
This leads to our next observation.
Proposition 6.2. Suppose all criminals behave cooperatively in the self-
reporting stage. Then, Ωc = (rc ≥ 2P cs − s, lc ≥ P cs, kc ≥ P cs, P c), where
at least one inequality is binding, and where P c is implicitly given by
C ′(P c) = 2
∫ b
P cs
f(b)dbf(P cs)h1s. (6.3)
Proof. For any P c given, social costs are strictly lower with self-reporting
if the total expected fine is constant since h1 < h2. Hence, the authority
can induce self-reporting at no cost by choosing either r, l or k such that
φci = P
cs. Nothing could be gained by further lowering one of these fines,
since self-reporting occurs anyway, and since total expected fine would be
lower. This given, social costs are
SC =
[∫ b
P cs
f(b)dbi
]2
h1 + C(P
c). (6.4)
P c as given in the Proposition follows from minimizing social costs with
respect to P c. ¥
Proposition 6.2 mirrors the KS 1994-result for cooperative teams. Since
the criminals act in concert in the self-reporting stage, they actually behave
like a single self-reporter. Hence, the fine with self-reporting must be the
same as the expected fine without self-reporting. Note that it does not make
any difference whether r+s
2
, l or k is the smaller one (as long as the minimum
equals P cs). In expectation, each cooperative violator bears P cs in any case.
5Superscript c indicates ”Cooperation”.
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Non-cooperative and cooperative behavior Now we assume that the
authority does not know whether teams act cooperatively or non-cooperatively
in the self-reporting stage. The question we are interested in is whether it
is then still optimal to impose the maximum fine l = s− ε if both criminals
self-report separately, and the minimum fine r = 0 if just one self-reports.
The problem is that cooperative teams may benefit from low r’s by deciding
that exactly one out of their team comes forward. Furthermore, P = ε can
no longer be optimal, because cooperative teams will then never self-report
(and will not be deterred at all).
Let us assume that violating teams act cooperatively in the self-reporting
stage with probability q, and non-cooperatively with 1 − q. Furthermore,
assume that individuals do not know ex ante if they will cooperate or not.6
Defining φni and φ
c
i as above, it follows that the borderline type who only
just violates is now given by
b˜ = qφci + (1− q)φni . (6.5)
Now recall that r has an upper bound due to Proposition 6.1 given
by rn < Ps, and a lower bound due to Proposition 6.2 (rc ≥ 2Ps − s).
Since 2Ps − s < Ps, each r ∈ [2Ps− s, Ps) ensures self-reporting by non-
cooperative violators without leading to the unwarranted side-effect that co-
operative teams can benefit from deciding that only one self-reports. This
leads immediately to
Proposition 6.3. Suppose the cooperation rate q is exogenous. (i) Then,
Ω = (r ≥ 2Ps − s, l = s − ε, k ≥ Ps, P ), where at least one inequality is
binding, r ≤ Ps, and where P is implicitly given by the FOC
C ′(P ) = 2f (˜b)h1qs
∫ b
b˜
f(b)db. (6.6)
(ii) A sufficient condition for dP
dq
> 0 is f ′(˜b) ≤ 0. If f ′(˜b) > 0, dP
dq
can be
negative if and only if C(P ) is sufficiently convex.
All remaining proofs are in the Appendix.
6This assumption may sometimes be reasonable, while in other cases individuals can
estimate the closeness of their relationship right from the beginning. Note that the as-
sumption has no qualitative impact on our results.
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If the inequality for r (k) is binding, then just one (both) out of a coop-
erative team come(s) forward. In both cases, the expected fine per capita is
Ps, and hence the same as without self-reporting. The intuition for Proposi-
tion 6.3 is that there is in fact no interdependence between cooperative and
non-cooperative teams as long as q is exogenous. For non-cooperative teams,
only l matters in equilibrium, since both will self-report anyway. Hence,
their equilibrium fine will still be φni = l, and it is still optimal to impose the
maximum fine l = s − ε if both self-report separately. On the other hand,
only r or k matters for cooperative teams, so that there is nothing against
setting their equilibrium fine again equal to Ps.
The optimal enforcement effort expressed by P is now different from the
one derived in Proposition 6.2, since social costs are
SC =
[∫ b
b˜
f(b)db
]2
h1 + C(P ), (6.7)
where b˜ = qPs+(1− q)s. Of course, the situations considered before can
now easily be interpreted as the special cases where either q = 0 or q = 1.
Part (ii) of Proposition 6.3 is more tricky. One might think that P should
always be increasing in q, because the incentive to violate is increasing in q
( ∂b˜
∂q
< 0), and this should motivate the authority to exert higher effort. We
have shown that this holds as long as f ′(˜b) is non-positive (in particular if b is
uniformly distributed). However, if f ′(˜b) > 0, then it is possible that dP
dq
< 0.
The intuition is as follows: If P is constant, then less violators are deterred
if q is increasing. The higher the density to the left of b˜, the more important
is this effect. f ′(˜b) > 0 means that the density is lower to the left of b˜, so
that the effect becomes less important (and thus the incentive to increase
P becomes smaller). This clarifies why f ′(˜b) > 0 is a necessary condition
for dP
dq
< 0. However, f ′(˜b) > 0 is only feasible for sufficiently convex cost
functions due to the second-order condition.
6.3 Endogenous Probability of Cooperation
So far, cooperation in the self-reporting stage offers no argument why the
maximum sanction should not be imposed if two criminals self-report sepa-
rately. However, the difference between equilibrium fines for non-cooperative
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and cooperative criminals may motivate criminals to search for credible ways
to induce cooperation. Formally, this means ∂q
∂∆
> 0 where ∆ ≡ φni − φci . In
this section, we analyze how this affects the optimal policy.
To model ∂q
∂∆
> 0 in a simple way, we assume that cooperation causes
identical transaction costs of t for each of the violators, and that t is uniformly
distributed on [0, t].7 These transaction costs may be explained by bargaining
under asymmetric information between the two partners or by any cost of
designing binding implicit contracts, but this is beyond the scope of our model
which aims to deduce the authority’s optimal policy if q is increasing in ∆.
Hence, we simply assume that teams learn their team-specific transaction
costs in the self-reporting stage, and that they behave cooperatively whenever
∆ ≥ t. Then, the authority has to take the impact of Ωe on q into account.8
The next table shows the extended game.
- t1 Authority commits to Ωe = (re, le, ke, Pe)
- t2 Individuals learn b
- t3 Individuals decide upon violation
- t4 Violators learn t and decide upon self–reporting (cooperatively if ∆ ≥ t).
In the self-reporting stage, nothing changes with respect to the previous
section except that q is endogenous. The borderline type who only just
violates is now given by
b˜e = qe(Ωe)φ
c + [1− qe(Ωe)]φn (6.8)
Note that qe depends on Ωe. Since a violation again takes place if both
individuals agree upon, social costs are now9
SC(Ωe) =
[∫ b
b˜
f(b)db
]2
[λh1 + (1− λ)h2] + C(Pe). (6.9)
Again, the authority can induce self-reporting at no cost for cooperative
teams by choosing re or ke such that the expected joint fine is the same as
7The assumption that t is the same for both violators simplifies the analysis without
changing the argument.
8Subscripts e denote the extended model.
9Analogously to the criminals’ benefit, we neglect transaction costs t in the social cost
function.
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without self-reporting which leads to φce = sPe. Note that re = sPe ensures
that S/S is the only Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative teams. It fol-
lows that each non-cooperative self-reporter will pay φne = le in equilibrium.
Hence,
∆ = le − sPe. (6.10)
Since cooperative self-reporting occurs if ∆ ≥ t, and since t ∈ [0, t] is
uniformly distributed, the cooperation probability qe(Ωe)) ≡ qe is
qe =
∆
t
=
le − sPe
t
. (6.11)
Eqn. (6.11) shows that the probability of cooperation is strictly increasing
in le for a given Pe. The borderline type b˜e who only just violates is given by
b˜e =
le − sPe
t
Pes+
[
1− le − sPe
t
]
le. (6.12)
We are now able to characterize the authority’s optimal policy.
Proposition 6.4. (i) In the extended model, we have
Ωe =
(
re ≥ 2Pes− s, le = min(Pes+ t
2
, s), ke ≥ Pes, Pe
)
, (6.13)
where at least one inequality is binding. Furthermore, r ≤ Pes, and Pe is
implicitly given by the FOC
C ′(Pe) = 2f (˜be)h1s
∫ b
b˜e
f(b)db. (6.14)
(ii) le < s if s >
t
2(1−Pe) . Otherwise, le = s.
The key difference to Proposition 6.3 is that the fine in case both violators
self-report separately is now only le = Pes +
t
2
as to reduce the rate of
cooperation. Thus, an endogenous rate of cooperation can explain why two
separately self-reporting criminals are not penalized with the maximum fine.
The higher le, the higher the fine if violators behave non-cooperatively in the
self-reporting stage. But the higher le, the higher the incentive to cooperate.
This leads to an interior solution for le.
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Furthermore, from le = Pes+
t
2
, it can easily be seen that le is increasing
in P e, s and t. The reasons are as follows: the higher Pe and s, the higher the
expected fine for cooperative teams, the lower ∆ for le given. Hence, le can
be increased if Pes increases. With respect to t, recall that we assume that
t is uniformly distributed between 0 and t. Hence, average transaction costs
are increasing in t, so that le can be enlarged without leading to too high a
cooperation rate. Part (ii) simply says there is no interior solution for le if
the maximum fine s is extremely low compared to average transaction costs.
In this pathological case, it does not matter at all whether q is endogenous
or not.
6.4 Imperfect Self-Reporting Technologies
We now return to the case where all criminals act non-cooperatively in the
self-reporting stage (Nash behavior) and introduce imperfect self-reporting
as an independent explanation why l must be chosen below the maximum
fine s. Let us define α1(2) as the probability that criminal 1(2) is convicted in
case his accomplice 2(1) self-reports. In reality, there is no reason to assume
that the clues that can be brought about by criminal 1 to convict criminal 2
are exactly the same as the ones that can be offered by 2 to convict 1. Hence,
one usually expects that α1 6= α2. All other assumptions are adopted from
section 6.2. Then, the expected fine structure is as follows (player 1 is the
row-player).
S N
S l1/l2 r1/ (α2 + P − α2P ) s
N (α1 + P − α1P ) s/r2 Ps/Ps
ri and li are defined as usual with the only difference that it may now be
optimal to choose non-identical fines due to α1 6= α2. Furthermore, nothing
changes if the accomplice does not self-report. Then, self-reporting is still
the best response if r ≤ Ps. If the accomplice, j say, self-reports, agent i
is now only convicted with probability αi. Since he is detected himself with
probability P , his overall probability of being convicted if he does not self-
report is αi + P − αiP . It follows that S/S is a Nash equilibrium only if
li ≤ (αi + P − αiP ) s ∀i. Note that the expected fine in case the accomplice
self-reports - (αi + P − αiP ) s - is still strictly above the one in case he does
CHAPTER 6. LAW ENFORCEMENT FOR CRIMINAL TEAMS 68
not self-report (Ps). It follows that the authority should assign higher self-
reporting fines when both violators self-report. This leads to10
Proposition 6.5. Suppose that self-reporting is imperfect. Then, (i)
Ω∗ = (r∗i ≤ P ∗s, l∗i = (P ∗ + αi − P ∗αi) s, P ∗) , i, j = 1, 2. (6.15)
(ii). l∗1 > l
∗
2 iff α1 > α2. (iii) P
∗ is implicitly given by the first order condition
C ′(P ∗) = f(l∗1)
∫ b
l∗2
f(b)dbh1(1− α1)s+ f(l∗2)
∫ b
l∗1
f(b)dbh1(1− α2)s (6.16)
(iv) A sufficient condition for dP
∗
dαi
< 0, i = 1, 2 is f ′(l∗i ) ≤ 0. If f ′(l∗i ) > 0,
dP ∗
dαi
can be positive iff C(P ∗) is sufficiently convex.
Part (i) expresses that it is again optimal to induce self-reporting by
both parties, and to assign the maximum fines that implement S/S as the
unique Nash equilibrium in the self-reporting stage. The reason is that P ∗+
αi − P ∗αi > P ∗ ∀αi > 0, meaning that the strategic interaction can still be
exploited to deter the criminals as long as αi is positive. Part (ii) says that
the self-reporting fine is higher for the one who is more often convicted by
his partner’s self-reporting. The intuition is that one is more tempted to self-
report if the accomplice may provide hard information, so that the fine can be
higher without destroying the incentive to self-report. Note that the quality
of the own information has no impact on the fine. In other words, the own
fine depends only on the quality of the partner’s self-reporting technology.
With respect to the authority’s optimal effort (P ∗), note that the two
criminals now have different borderline types, since the expected equilibrium
fines differ for non-identical α’s. Expected social costs are thus
SC =
∫ b
l∗1
f(b)db
∫ b
l∗2
f(b)dbh1 + C(P ), (6.17)
which yields the FOC given in Proposition 6.5. The intuition behind (iv)
is identical to the discussion of the q-dependence in Proposition 6.3 (ii).
10An asterix indicates imperfect monitoring technologies.
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6.5 Discussion
In our basic model, maximum deterrence can be reached by self-reporting
schemes at almost no cost. This shows that the concept of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma is indeed valuable for the design of an optimal law enforcement
even if the members of a criminal team are not yet detected. The pure
threat of cooperation among team members does not alter this result as long
as a fixed probability of cooperation is assumed. If, however, the rate of co-
operation becomes endogenous, the maximum fine will no longer be assigned
in equilibrium if both criminals self-report separately. The same holds for
imperfect self-reporting technologies where compliance of one violator does
not necessarily lead to a conviction of the other violator. To relate this re-
sults to the legal situation and to contribute to the controversies mentioned
in chapter 2 and 3, we conclude with an analysis of the relevance of some
crucial assumptions of our model.
One might question why criminals who cooperate in the self-reporting
stage do not also maximize their joint utility in the violation stage. This
would mean that a violation does not require that both b1 ≥ φ1 and b2 ≥
φ2 hold, but only that Σbi ≥ Σφi. Since this is less restrictive, it leads
ceteris paribus to higher a violation rate, and thus to a re-adjustment of the
authority’s optimal policy. But since the results are not affected qualitatively,
we have restricted our attention to Nash-behavior in the violation stage.
Another question is why we are not more explicit about the reasons for
endogenous cooperation in the self-reporting stage. For instance, in the in-
finitely repeated collusion game considered by Motta and Polo (1999), poten-
tial future benefits from ongoing illegal behavior explains why the criminals
do only come forward if the self-reporting fines are relatively low. In fact,
there may also be many other barriers to self-reporting like reciprocal behav-
ior in a criminal sub-society, for instance. In any of these cases, the important
point is that the cooperation rate is increasing in ∆.
It could be asked what we actually mean by the S/S-equilibrium, i.e. by
separate and simultaneous self-reporting of both criminals. In our model,
self-reporting occurs at the same time (stage 4 in our game structure). Of
course, this does not mean that both criminals enter the police department
exactly at the same time, but through different doors. In reality, two non-
cooperative self-reporters will never come forward at exactly the same time.
However, suppose that one criminal, i say, self-reports first, followed by self-
reporting of criminal j. The court must then decide whether it treats the case
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as simultaneous self-reporting or not - in the first case, it would assign fine l
to both criminals, whereas fines r and s would be imposed in the latter case.
Presumably, the court would decide for simultaneous self-reporting if player j
does not get a signal on player i’s self-reporting behavior, i.e. if both players
move in the same information set. In reality, courts usually do not account
for simultaneous self-reporting. In other words, the fine for a criminal is
either r or s. However, note that our results also hold in a slightly modified
manner if we exclude simultaneous self-reporting. To see this, suppose that
each criminal is the first one to self-report with probability 0.5 if both decide
to self-report. Then, the expected fine in the S/S–equilibrium is r+s
2
instead
of l. As long as r+s
2
> Ps, the expected fine can still be increased for any
P given by implementing self-reporting as a dominant strategy. In fact,
our mechanism would then induce a race to the bottom, since each criminal
would try to be the first one who self-reports. Note that, with n instead of 2
criminals, the expected fine is 1
n
r+ n−1
n
s and thus converges to s for n→∞.
Hence, assuming sequential instead of simultaneous self-reporting would not
alter the basic structure of our argument. However, this is exactly the race-
to-the-courtroom that has been emphasized by the U.S. cartel prosecution
authority (see chapter 2). In a way our model justifies such an enforcement
scheme.
There might be the criticism that all violators self-report in our model
(as in the basic Kaplow-Shavell-model with single violators). To get partial
self-reporting, one would have to take asymmetric information with respect
to the detection probabilities (θ, say) into account as it has been done in
the discussion of law enforcement against single violators in chapter 4 and 5.
Then, only offenders with high probabilities of apprehension (high θ’s) would
self-report. Depending on the realization of θ, we could then get partial self-
reporting in equilibrium. Now suppose that the authority prefers full self-
reporting to partial self-reporting, for instance because this reduces errors
in court or investigation costs. Of course, this makes only sense for α < 1,
i.e. if the non-reporting criminal cannot certainly be convicted through the
confession of his accomplice anyway. Then, the authority allows for a second
self-reporting stage where a self-reporting fine d with r < d < s is imposed.
In other words, asymmetric information combined with α < 1 may explain
why there are different fine reductions in a game where, depending on the
realization of θ, sequential self-reporting can be an equilibrium. We elaborate
on this question in the next chapter.
Most importantly, such an extension questions our result that the op-
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timal self-reporting fine is independent of the amount of evidence provided
by the self-reporter. Recall from our discussion of the legal situation that
fine reductions in corporate leniency programs are differentiated according
to the probability that accomplices can be convicted through the informa-
tion provided. In our model, this means that l1 (or r1) is decreasing in α2.
Note that this contrasts our findings: At least in our setting, the incentive to
self-report does not depend on the quality of the own information offered to
the court, but on the risk that one is convicted through the clues provided
by the accomplice. If these clues are only insufficiently valuable, then one
is no longer willing to self-report, and the equilibrium fine must be lowered.
Of course, this would also hold if one considers the ”race to the courtroom”
described above instead of our setting. However, the fact that l1 is indepen-
dent of α2 in our model follows from the fact that we get full self-reporting
in equilibrium. Suppose again that we have asymmetric information as to
the detection probabilities, so that we may get partial self-reporting in equi-
librium. Then, the higher α2, the more likely criminal 2 can be convicted
through criminal 1’s confession. Thus, the higher α2, the more valuable is
player 1’s confession, the lower is his self-reporting fine. We will discuss this
effect in more detail in the next chapter as well.
All in all, our theoretical results together with empirical evidence from
corporate leniency programs indicate that exploiting the criminals’ strategic
interaction in the self-reporting stage is a mighty instrument to deter crime.
More substantial fine reductions (and thus somewhat less deterrence) are re-
quired if endogenous cooperation or imperfect technologies seem to be viru-
lent (both very likely in cartel prosecution). Hence, leniency programs should
be extended to other fields with comparable features as well. In Germany,
for instance, all attempts to implement a leniency program for corruption
have yet failed according to legal and moral considerations, and incentive
arguments are hardly taken into account. We believe that the problem of
endogenous cooperative behavior in the self-reporting stage fits this situation
especially well, so that the fine (l) in case both come forward should not be
maximum.
However, as we have shown the major importance of partial self-reporting
in previous chapters, this model has to be extended in several aspects to
analyze the details of a law enforcement scheme and to compare different
legal situations. This will be the aim of the next section.
Chapter 7
Corporate Leniency Programs
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter we develop a model to analyze and to compare the corporate
leniency programs in the EU and in the USA. As discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, the idea of leniency programs for teams is straightforward: by
reducing the fine for the first self-reporter while imposing high fines for all
other team members, each one has an incentive to be the first one who comes
forward. Given that all members are identical, each of them will win the race
with probability 1/n, but will pay a high fine with probability n−1
n
. Hence,
reducing the fines for self-reporting firms can increase the expected fine, and
thereby deterrence.
In contrast to the previous chapter we consider a model where two firms
agree upon collusive behavior whenever their team-benefit is (weakly) above
their aggregated expected fines.1 To compare the leniency programs enacted
in the USA and the EU and to deduce the optimal policy, we have to depart
from the basic set-up presented in the last chapter in several other respects.
First, we assume that the probability of being detected does not only
depend on the authority’s investigation effort, but also on team-specific at-
tributes (”types”) that are private information. As in chapter 4 and 5 we
assume that these types are learned only after a violation has been commit-
ted, such that we are back in the world of ex post asymmetric information.
For instance, the team might learn after the violation that it has acted care-
1As already pointed out in chapter 6 this assumption is not crucial for the qualitative
results.
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less in some sense, or that a (potential) new market entrant will not be
willing to join the cartel. Since self-reporting occurs only if the type-specific
detection probability is known to be high, the possibility to self-report leads
to the by now familiar option value of self-reporting that ceteris paribus re-
duces the expected fine to be paid and represents the major disadvantage of a
self-reporting scheme. In addition it provides a straightforward explanation
of partial self-reporting in equilibrium which turned out to be important in
the case of imperfect monitoring where fines are conditional on the amount
of evidence provided (see the discussion at the end of chapter 6).
Second, we distinguish between two self-reporting stages. A criminal
may self-report before his case is detected, or after he has been detected, but
not yet convicted. This distinction is important as it will turn out that the
strategic interactions between the two criminals differ considerably in the two
stages. We will point out that the pre-detection stage can best be described
as a race to the courtroom, whereas the second stage is simply the classical
prisoner’s dilemma. This distinction is especially required to compare the
different legal situations in the EU and in the USA.
Third, we distinguish among different degrees of evidence the criminals
can provide about their partner, and analyze how this difference should in-
fluence the self-reporting fines imposed.
In such a model, we derive the authority’s optimal investigation and con-
viction efforts, and the optimal fine reductions in both self-reporting stages.
We show when full or rather partial immunity for the first self-reporter is op-
timal, how fine reductions should be differentiated in the two self-reporting
stages, and how fines should depend on the amount of evidence produced.
Finally, this allows us to compare the schemes applied in the EU and the
USA.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 develops
the model. Following backwards induction, section 7.3 analyzes the convic-
tion stage, and section 7.4 the pre-detection stage. Section 7.5 discusses the
violation stage and derives the authority’s optimal policy. Section 7.6 per-
forms some comparative statics. Section 7.7 analyzes the leniency programs
in the EU and the USA, and reviews the assumptions of our model.
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7.2 The Model
We consider two firms i = H,L that may agree upon violating a law. Let b
denote the aggregated benefit from violation, where b ∈ [0, b] is distributed
with continuous density f(b). For simplicity, we follow the usual assumption
that b is sunk when the violators decide upon self-reporting. Furthermore,
we assume that a violation takes place whenever b is weakly above the ag-
gregated expected fine denoted Φ, which means that we implicitly allow for
side-payments in the violation stage. The significance of these and other as-
sumptions will be discussed in the last section. We define b˜ as the minimum
benefit needed for a violation, i.e. b˜ = Φ. Violation causes harm h regardless
of whether it is detected or not.
Next, we distinguish between a detection probability P1 and a conviction
probability p2. P1 ≡ p1θ depends on two variables: on the authority’s effort
p1 ∈ (0, 1), and on individual team attributes θ. Investigation costs are
C1(p1), with C
′
1(p1) > 0, C
′′
1 (p1) > 0, and lim
p1→1
C ′1(p1) = ∞, lim
p1→0
C ′1(p1) = 0.
After violation, the team gets a signal θ on its type, where θ ∈ [0, 1] is
distributed with density g(θ).2
If the case is detected and brought to court, this does not necessarily mean
that the violators can actually be convicted. The conviction probability de-
pends on whether the accomplice self-reports or not. If H(L) self-reports, the
accomplice will be convicted with probability αH(αL). Hence, αH(αL) is the
evidence provided by H(L). We assume αH > αL, and refer to H(L) as the
high (low) type. If no-one self reports, then each team member is convicted
with probability p2, where C
′
2(p2) > 0, C
′′
2 (p2) > 0, and lim
p2→αL
C ′2(p2) = ∞,
lim
p2→0
C ′2(p2) = 0. The assumption lim
p2→αL
C ′2(p2) = ∞ is a convenient way
to express that the conviction probability can never be higher than with
self-reporting. As usual, fines are bounded above by s.
Our game is as follows: In stage 0, the authority commits to its policy
Ω ≡ (p1, p2, ri1, ri2b, ri2s), i = H,L where ri1 are the self-reporting fines for the
pre-detection stage, and where ri2b and r
i
2s refer to the conviction stage. r
i
2b is
imposed if both self-report, whereas ri2s is imposed for a single self-reporter.
Differentiating the fines between types H and L simply means that the fine
depends on the amount of evidence provided, and has nothing to do with
2One could also say that p1 is the investigation probability, and θ the (individual)
detection probability if the case is investigated. What matters is that the case is brought
to court with probability p1θ.
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illegal discrimination.3
In stage 1, nature chooses b, and the team decides upon violation in stage
2. In stage 3, nature chooses θ, and each member of the team decides on
whether to self-report or not in stage 4.
For stages 4 and 5, note carefully the difference between the two self-
reporting stages: in the pre-detection stage, there is a race to the courtroom,
and only one criminal can win the race if both try to self-report. The self-
reporter pays fine ri1, and the partner is convicted with probability αH or αL,
respectively, and pays maximum fine s. If no-one self-reports and the team
is detected, we get a second self-reporting stage. There, the two members
are interrogated separately as in the original prisoner’s dilemma, so that the
fine can be made contingent on whether the partner self-reports or not. This
explains the distinction between ri2b and r
i
2s, while there is no such distinction
in the first self-reporting stage.
In both self-reporting stages, there may be multiple equilibria. As equi-
librium selection criterion, we assume throughout that the team plays the
equilibrium that minimizes aggregated expected fines (Kaldor-Hicks domi-
nance). All of our conclusions would even be reinforced when dropping this
assumption.
The authority’s goal is to minimize social costs given by
SC =
∫ b
b˜=Φ
f(b)dbh+ C1(p1) + C2(p2). (7.1)
7.3 Conviction Stage
Following backwards induction, we start in stage 5 when the team has been
detected without self-reporting. Then, fines for types H and L are as follows:
SL NL
SH r
H
2b/r
L
2b r
H
2s/αHs
NH αLs/r
L
2s p2s/p2s
If both self-report, they pay fines rH2b and r
L
2b, respectively. If only one
self-reports, he pays ri2s. We get
3More explicitly, we could assume that the fine is x if the partner can be convicted,
and y if the partner can not be found guilty. Then, we would have rH2s = αLx+(1−αH)y
and rL2s = αLx+ (1− αL)y, respectively.
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Proposition 7.1. Suppose the team has been detected. Then, in the optimal
policy, p2 = ε, and either r
L
2s, r
H
2s or both are equal to zero, both violators
self-report, and pay fines rH2b = αLs− ε, rL2b = αHs− ε with ε→ 0.4
All Proofs are in the Appendix.
The intuition for Proposition 7.1 is as follows: First, the authority can
induce full self-reporting as there is no asymmetric information in the con-
viction stage. Second, the authority can drive the two firms in a prisoner’s
dilemma by making the fine contingent on the behavior of the accomplice.
This given, the authority prefers to implement the S ≡ SH/SL-Equilibrium,
because the fines if only one self-reports need to be low to destroy the
N ≡ NH/NL-Equilibrium (which would lead to the lowest aggregated fine).
This given, the authority assigns the maximum fines that supports S as an
Equilibrium. The optimal self-reporting fine is increasing in the amount of
evidence provided by the partner, so that type H pays only αLs, whereas
type L pays αHs. p2 → 0 can be chosen because neither rH2s nor rL2s influences
the equilibrium fines rH2b and r
L
2b.
Note that Proposition 7.1 already captures the authority’s optimal policy
for stage 5 which seems to violate the concept of subgame perfection as
the authority’s optimal policy is chosen in stage 0. However, the policy
vector described in Proposition 1 maximizes the expected fine in stage 5,
and minimizes the expected costs by setting p2 → 0 for all values of p1 and
ri1, so that there is no conceptual problem. Let us define Φ2 = αHs + αLs
as the expected fine in stage 5, and note carefully that Φ2 refers only to
the situation where the team is detected without self-reporting in the pre-
detection stage.
7.4 Pre-Detection Stage
We can now turn to the self-reporting decision before the team has been
detected. Recall that each one wins the race to the court with probability
0.5 if both play Si. Given our results for stage 5, the expected fine matrix is
as follows.
4From now on we will neglect ² for ease of exposition.
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SL NL
SH 0.5
(
rH1 + αLs
)
/0.5
(
rL1 + αHs
)
rH1 /αHs
NH αLs/r
L
1 θp1αLs/θp1αHs
Compared to the conviction stage, there are two differences: first, the
authority can not differentiate the fines with one or two self-reporters. This
is exactly the difference between a prisoner’s dilemma and a race to the
courtroom. Second, there is asymmetric information with respect to the
team-specific detection probability θ, so that the N-equilibrium can only be
certainly destroyed by setting either rH1 or r
L
1 equal to zero.
N is an equilibrium if θp1αLs ≤ rH1 and θp1αHs ≤ rL1 . Hence, the critical
θ for types H and L that support N only just as an equilibrium are given by
θ˜H ≡ r
H
1
p1αLs
and θ˜L ≡ r
L
1
p1αHs
, respectively. Of course, θ is the same for both
members of the team, but the N-equilibrium can be destroyed by choosing
either rH1 or r
L
1 low enough. We are thus left with the following possibili-
ties (where we have to take into account that the authority will adjust p1
accordingly).
(1) SH/NL is an equilibrium if r
L
1 ≥ αHs and rH1 ≤ θp1αLs. Since the
borderline type θ˜ is given by θ˜H , the aggregated expected fine in this situation
amounts to
Φ (SH/NL;N) =
∫ θ˜H
0
θp1s (αL + αH) g(θ)dθ+
∫ 1
θ˜H
(
rH1 + αHs
)
g(θ)dθ (7.2)
If θ ≤ θ˜H , the team plays the N-equilibrium and is detected with θp1.
Recalling from the previous section that Φ2 = αLs + αHs explains the first
integral in Eqn. (7.2). If θ > θ˜H , type H self-reports, and this leads to the
second integral. Note that Φ(·) is the expected overall fine for any p1 given,
and given that the the fines for the second self-reporting stage are optimally
designed as stated in Proposition 7.1.
(2) NH/SL is an equilibrium if r
H
1 ≥ αLs and rL1 ≤ θp1αHs. Similar
reasoning leads to
Φ (NH/SL;N) =
∫ θ˜L
0
θp1s (αL + αH) g(θ)dθ +
∫ 1
θ˜L
(
rH1 + αLs
)
g(θ)dθ. (7.3)
(3) SH/SL ≡ S is an equilibrium if rH1 ≤ αLs and rL1 ≤ αHs. However,
we must take into account that the aggregated expected fine also depends on
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whether the borderline type to destroy the N-equilibrium is implemented via
θ˜H or via θ˜L. Distinguishing between these two subcases yields the following
expected fines:
Φ
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
=
∫ θ˜H
0
θp1s (αL + αH) g(θ)dθ+
∫ 1
θ˜H
(
0.5
(
rH1 + αLs
)
+ rL1
)
g(θ)dθ
(7.4)
and
Φ
(
Sθ˜L ;N
)
=
∫ θ˜L
0
θp1s (αL + αH) g(θ)dθ+
∫ 1
θ˜L
(
0.5
(
rL1 + αHs
)
+ rH1
)
g(θ)dθ
(7.5)
Define Φ as the maximum expected fine the authority can implement in
stage 4 for p1 given, i.e. Φ ≡ maxΦ(·).
7.5 Violation Decision and the Authority’s
Optimal Policy
To analyze the optimal policy, recall first that the existence of theN-equilibrium
depends on θ which is not known to the authority. However, the authority
can decide with certainty which of the other three potential equilibria it
wants to exclude. Hence, we need to compare the different cases under the
assumption that the authority minimizes social costs for each alternative.
Since a violation takes place whenever b ≥ Φ, the authority minimizes
SC =
∫ b
b=Φ
f(b)dbh+ C(p1), (7.6)
where we have neglected C2(p2 → 0) = 0 which will hold in the SPE.
If the authority prefers the SH/NL-Equilibrium, it sets r
L
1 ≥ αHs and mini-
mizes SC (SH/NL;N) with respect to p1 and r
H
1 (the higher r
H
1 , the higher Φ
if SH/NL is played, but the higher the probability that N becomes an equi-
librium). Analogously, if it prefers the NH/SL-Equilibrium, it sets r
H
1 ≥ αLs
and minimizes SC (NH/SL;N) with respect to p1 and to r
H
1 . Note that,
even for p1 given, the sign of [SC (SH/NL;N)− SC (NH/SL;N)] in the au-
thority’s optimal policy is not obvious as, for rH1 = r
L
1 , we have αHs > αLs
(which is in favor of SH/NL), but θ˜H > θ˜L (which is in favor of NH/SL as it
leads to more self-reporting).
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In the two subcases for the S-equilibrium, the authority will clearly set
rL1 = αHs and r
H
1 = αLs, respectively. This is so because r
L
1 (r
H
1 ) has no
impact on the self-reporting frequency, and is therefore chosen as to maximize
deterrence under the restriction that S is an equilibrium. These insights lead
to
Lemma 7.1. In the authority’s optimal policy SC(·), we have (i) SC
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
<
SC (SH/NL;N) and (ii) SC
(
Sθ˜L ;N
)
< SC (NH/SL;N).
The reason for Lemma 7.1 is that the incentive to self-report is higher
when the partner self-reports, because the probability of being detected in-
creases from θp1 to αH(αL), and because the maximum fine will then be
imposed anyway. This means that in the SPE, either both or no-one try
to be the first one to self-report, and we can restrict our attention to the
comparison of
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
and
(
Sθ˜L ;N
)
. This yields
Proposition 7.2. In the authority’s optimal policy (i) rL1 = αHs, (ii) The
optimal values for rH1 and p1 are given by the minimization of SC
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
and are derived in the Appendix. (iii) In equilibrium, both types try to be
the first one to self-report if θ˜H ≥ r
H
1
p1αLs
, whereas no-one self-reports if θ˜H <
rH1
p1αLs
. (iv) A sufficient condition for 0 < θ˜ < 1 is that g(θ) satisfies g(0) = 0.
If there is no interior solution, the authority induces full self-reporting by
setting rH1 = 0. A sufficient condition for this is that g
′(θ) ≤ 0.
Proposition 7.2 has some appealing features. Part (i) means that in the
authority’s optimal policy, SC
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
< SC
(
Sθ˜L ;N
)
. Thus, the author-
ity assigns the high self-reporting fine rL1 = αHs to type L who provides low
evidence, and who is convicted by his partner’s testimony with high proba-
bility αH . This implies that type H is pivotal for the question whether N
is an equilibrium or not. This is by no means trivial: On the one hand,
the maximum self-reporting fine that can be assigned to type L without de-
stroying the S-equilibrium is higher (rL1 = αHs > r
H
1 = αLs) which supports(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
. But on the other hand, if the self-reporting fine for the one who
is crucial for the N-equilibrium were the same (rH1 = r
L
1 ), then self-reporting
occurs less often in the
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
-case, since θ˜H > θ˜L for r
H
1 = r
L
1 . Part (i)
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thus says that the first effect always dominates. Parts (ii) is clear,and part
(iii) is a straightforward implication of Lemma 7.1.
Part (iv) expresses that the authority will either induce partial or full
self-reporting. Partial self-reporting means that rH1 > 0 which supports N as
an equilibrium for low values of θ. Hence, not all teams will come forward,
because the fine reduction for the first self-reporter is below 100 percent. On
the other hand, depending on the distribution of θ, it may also be optimal
to choose rH1 = 0, so that S is a unique equilibrium for all θ’s. Then, the
authority will choose p1 → 0, which means that the investigation effort can
almost be reduced to zero, since all cases will be self-reported anyway.
g(0) = 0 ensures that all violators know that they will be detected with
positive probability, so that a full amnesty cannot be optimal. A decreasing
probability of apprehension (g′(θ) ≤ 0) means that there is a large number
of violators that will only come forward if a full fine reduction is granted, so
that this will be optimal.
However, full immunity can never be optimal for type L (rL1 = αHs if L
is the one who wins the race to the courtroom).
Taking Proposition 7.1 and Proposition 7.2 together, we wish to empha-
size the following aspects of the authority’s optimal policy. First, in equi-
librium either both or no-one try to self-report. Second, depending on g(θ),
either all or only some teams will self-report in the pre-detection stage. If
all teams self-report, then type H pays no fine at all (full immunity), oth-
erwise he pays a positive fine. Third, type L pays the same self-reporting
fine regardless of whether he reports before or after the case is detected
(rL1 = r
L
2b = αHs). And fourth, if the team is detected without having self-
reported, the key feature of the prisoner’s dilemma is that the authority sets
ri2s < r
i
2b ∀i which is not feasible in the pre-detection stage.
So far, we did not explicitly consider the authority’s behavior if one
member of the team has self-reported in the pre-detection stage. If type
H has self-reported in the pre-detection stage, type L is convicted with
probability αH and pays expected fine αHs. Suppose that convicting him
with probability αH causes some fixed cost x > 0 although type H pro-
vides evidence αH . Then, it is clearly optimal to assign a self-reporting
fine, rL3 say, with r
L
3 = αHs − ε to induce self-reporting for type L.5 Since
s > rL3 = αHs − ε < rL1 , it follows that the fine in the conviction stage is
(infinitisimally) smaller than in the pre-detection stage. Contrary, if type L
5This is of course nothing but the standard KS 1994 argument.
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has self-reported in the pre-detection stage, type H is convicted with prob-
ability αL and pays αLs in expectation. As long as conviction is costly, it is
again optimal to assign a fine rH3 = αLs − ². Note, that rH3 > rH1 such that
the fine in the pre-detection stage is smaller than in the conviction stage.
7.6 Comparative Statics
With respect to the comparative statics of the model, we are mainly in-
terested in how the optimal fine vector depends on the evidence provided,
i.e. on αH and αL. Suppose first that the case has been detected without
self-reporting. Then, we have simply rH2b = αLs and r
H
2b = αHs, so that
∂rH2b
∂αL
=
∂rL2b
∂αH
= s > 0, which means that the own self-reporting fine is increas-
ing in the evidence provided by the partner.
For the first self-reporting stage, we have rL1 = αLs, so that the fine for the
low-evidence provider is again independent of his own evidence, and increas-
ing in the evidence provided by his accomplice. Both results are straightfor-
ward implications of the fact that the authority prefers that type H is pivotal
for the self-reporting decision.
In contrast, the impacts of αH and αL on r
H
1 are far from being trivial. In-
tuitively, one would assume that the self-reporting fine for the high-evidence
provider H should be decreasing in αH (
drH1
dαH
< 0 ) since his report is then
more valuable. However, there are countervailing effects . In the Appendix,
we show that
drH1
dαH
< 0 if and only if
∂2SC
∂rH1 ∂αH
∂2SC
∂p21
− ∂
2SC
∂p1∂αH
∂2SC
∂p1∂rH1
> 0. (7.7)
In the following, we explain why this expression is in general ambiguous in
sign and depends on the particular distributions of b and θ. To see that
∂2SC
∂rH1 ∂αH
∂2SC
∂p21
> 0, note that for rH1 > 0,
∂2SC
∂p21
> 0 is guaranteed by an interior
solution for p1. Furthermore,
∂2SC
∂rH1 ∂αH
= −f(Φ)αH ∂
2Φ
∂rH1 ∂αH
> 0. (7.8)
∂2SC
∂rH1 ∂αH
∂2SC
∂p21
> 0 can be interpreted as the direct effect of a higher αH , and
supports the intuition given above. The impact of αH on the expected fine
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Φ is lower if rh1 is increasing since violators will less often self-report. Thus
6
∂2Φ
∂rH1 ∂αH
< 0 and ∂
2SC
∂rH1 ∂αH
> 0 which leads ceteris paribus to
drH1
dαH
< 0.
However, any change in αH and r
H
1 results in an adjustment of p1. This
is covered by − ∂2SC
∂p1∂αH
∂2SC
∂p1∂rH1
. First, note that
∂2SC
∂p1∂αH
= −f ′(Φ) ∂Φ
∂αH
αH
∂Φ
∂p1
− f(Φ)αH ∂
2Φ
∂p1∂αH
Q 0 (7.9)
for the following reason: Clearly, both ∂Φ
∂p1
and ∂Φ
∂αH
are positive. Further-
more, ∂
2Φ
∂p1∂αH
is positive as well, since the marginal impact of higher evidence
production (αH) is increasing if the team fears to be detected more often (i.e.
if p1 is higher). Thus, a sufficient condition for
∂2SC
∂p1∂αH
< 0 is that f ′(b) ≥ 0.
If not, any increase in Φ (due to p1 or αH) leads to a smaller number of vi-
olators that can be deterred by an increase of αH or p1. This countervailing
effect may dominate for particular distributions of benefit. Second,
∂2SC
∂p1∂rH1
= −f(Φ)αH ∂
2Φ
∂p1∂rH1
Q 0. (7.10)
A sufficient condition for ∂
2Φ
∂p1∂rH1
> 0 is g′(θ) ≥ 0. ∂Φ
∂p1
is then increasing
in rH1 , because the number of violators who refuse to self-report for small
fine-reductions is high. However, if the marginal number of self-reporters
decreases in rH1 (g
′(θ˜H) < 0), a countervailing effect arises. In this case, the
higher rH1 , the smaller is the marginal number of non-reporters deterred by
an increase in p1. Therefore,
∂2SC
∂p1∂rH1
can be positive if g′(θ˜H) < 0 dominates.
Hence, ∂
2SC
∂p1∂rH1
∂2SC
∂p1∂αH
Q 0.
Summing up, we can identify a direct effect leading to
drH1
dαH
< 0. The
indirect effect caused by the optimal adjustment of p1 depends on f(b) and
g(θ) as the deterrence effect depends on the marginal number of violators and
self-reporters that is affected by a change in p1. If f
′(b) ≥ 0 and g′(θ) ≥ 0,
this indirect effect results ceteris paribus in
drH1
dαH
> 0.
The impact of αL on r
H
1 is more subtle as αL does not only enter into
the fines, but also into the borderline type who only just self-reports. Thus,
there are more countervailing effects, and we do not want to describe them
6All detailed calculations for dr
H
1
dαL
and dr
H
1
dαH
are available on request.
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formally. If the accomplice provides more evidence, this increases ceteris
paribus type H’s incentive to self-report, which should allow for a higher
rH1 . However, the marginal effect again depends on the density, so that this
effect is ambiguous. The same holds for the indirect effect caused by p1:
Any increase in αL leads to higher fines for non-reporters, and thus increases
the impact of p1, but the direction depends again on g(θ). Hence, it is not
necessarily the case that
drH1
dαL
> 0 as one might have expected.
7.7 Discussion
Conclusions for the two leniency programs First of all, our analysis
has shown that - even in the presence of ex-post asymmetric information
- self reporting schemes for criminal teams are much more promising than
those for single violators, since strategic interactions between team members
can be used to increase expected fines, and to reduce the frequency of viola-
tions. This is impossible for single violators. Hence, we emphasize that these
programs should be extended to other fields once again.
Besides this generalization of our basic result from chapter 6, our findings
can be used to compare the corporate leniency programs in the EU and the
USA. In chapter 2, four main differences have been identified:
(i) In the USA, the first self-reporting firm always gets full immunity.
In our model, full immunity in the pre-detection stage means that there is
no interior solution, and this occurs for some distribution functions of the
private information parameter θ. Hence, either full or partial immunity can
be optimal. However, we can say that full immunity should only be granted
if the evidence provided is high, i.e. in our model if it is above the evidence
that could have been provided by the accomplice (the L-type should never
get full immunity).
(ii) In the EU-program, it is explicitly stated that fine reductions increase
in the amount of evidence provided. Although this seems straightforward,
our findings are somewhat more complicated. Although the low evidence
provider pays higher self-reporting fines, the impact of the evidence pro-
vided on the absolute self-reporting fine for the high type is ambiguous due
to countervailing effects caused by the optimal adjustment of the detection
probability, and due to the distribution of types.
(iii) Granting no fine reduction at all for a second self-reporter (as in the
USA) is inferior as long as investigation costs in the conviction stage are
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positive. Then, it is - as always - better to introduce a self-reporting fine
equal to the expected fine coming from the partner’s testimony (i.e. αHs
and αLs, respectively).
(iv) Finally, full immunity can also be granted in the USA if the case
is already under investigation. According to our model, the EU-approach
where the maximum fine reduction is limited is superior, since the fines in
the conviction stage should be higher than in the pre-detection stage for the
one who provides more evidence. In contrast to both leniency programs, we
find that the fine for the one who provides less evidence (type L) should be
(almost) the same in both self-reporting stages (rL2b = r
L
1 ). The reason is that
it is unwarranted that type L wins the race to the courtroom, which explains
the high fine rL1 = αHs.
Significance of assumptions Finally, we want to discuss the plausibility
and the significance of the assumptions underlying our analysis.
(i) In our model, we restrict the problem of private information to the ben-
efits and to the detection probability, and do not extend it to the conviction
probability (i.e. to the second self-reporting stage). However, asymmetric
information in the second stage would not alter the result at all, because
one could still implement self-reporting as a dominant strategy by choosing
ri2s equal to zero, so that θ would have no impact on the equilibrium fines
rh2b = αLs and r
l
2b = αHs.
(ii) At least implicitly, we allow for cooperative behavior in the violation
stage (by assuming that violations occur for b ≥ Φ), whereas we consider only
non-cooperative behavior in the two self-reporting stages. Non-cooperative
behavior in the violation stage would lead to less offenses, since both indi-
vidual expected fines would need to be above the benefit, but this would not
change the optimal scheme qualitatively.
(iii) Recall from the previous chapter that cooperative behavior in the
self-reporting stage would lead us back to the single violator case. Moreover,
exogenous probabilities of cooperation do not alter our results at all. An en-
dogenous cooperation frequency, however, would eliminate corner solutions.
(iii) To analyze cartel behavior, a repeated game seems a natural assump-
tion (see Motta and Polo (1999) and Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2001)). The
key aspect of repeated interaction is that the team has some future benefits
if it is not detected, and this reduces the incentive to self-report. This aspect
could also be modelled in a reduced form by assuming that b is non-sunk.
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Then, without ex post asymmetric information, the optimal self-reporting
fine is negative (i.e. a self-reporting firm needs to be subsidized) to induce
full self-reporting. In our model, the optimal fine would still depend on g(θ),
and could, but does not have to be negative. This puts the policy suggestions
made in Spagnolo (2000) into a new context. Assuming that b is non-sunk,
however, has high opportunity costs in our model. The problem is that
both the violation decision and the self-reporting decision in the first self-
reporting stage would then depend on b, so that the authority would have
to update its initial information after a violation has taken place. But this
would inevitably lead to a signaling game that is beyond the scope of this
contribution, as it would be impossible to derive clear cut results. This could
only be avoided by cutting out ex post asymmetric information and/or the
second self-reporting stage, but we believe that these two elements are more
important for the analysis of the programs at hand. Hence, our model should
be considered as complementary to Motta and Polo (1999) and Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (2001).7
(iv) Our first self-reporting stage is characterized as a race to the court-
room, while the second self-reporting stage is a prisoner’s dilemma. As we
have shown in the previous chapter, deterrence could considerably be in-
creased if the first stage could also be designed as a prisoner’s dilemma by
assigning low fines for a single self-reporter, but high fines if both self-report.
Self-reporting of both members would then require to define a time window
(of two or three days, say) where self-reporting would be interpreted as ”si-
multaneous self-reporting”. Although tempting from a theoretical viewpoint,
legal scholars convinced us that making the fine for a self-reporter in the pre-
detection stage contingent on whether the second one self reports or not is
legally unacceptable and impracticable.
7From a more practical point of view, there is an additional point to note. In reality,
the maximum fine that can be imposed depends on the severity of crime which is not
independent of the expected future benefits from crime. Hence, s would need to be made
endogenous, and contingent on b.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This contribution analyzes the role of self-reporting in optimal law enforce-
ment. A comparison of the legal situation (and some ongoing discussions
among legal scholars) with a review of the existing literature of the economic
analysis of law shows certain research directions. We tried to contribute to
a solution of these open questions in several respects.
1. While legal scholars emphasize the increasing incentive to violate due to
the introduction of an opportunity to self-report, the theoretical litera-
ture on self-reporting focuses on self-reporting fines just below expected
fines such that the incentive to violate remains constant. Recently, ex-
post asymmetric information has been factored into the analysis to ac-
count for the option value of self-reporting. However, the pure existence
result that marginal self-reporting is always welfare-improving seems to
be of little help if one wants to modify law enforcement. In chapter 4 we
classified different criminal acts with respect to their degree of ex-post
asymmetric information and developed a model that provides settings
in which the optimal fine-reduction decreases or increases in this degree
of heterogeneity. This allows for a distinction between criminal acts for
which a substantial fine-reduction seems promising (e.g. tax-evasion)
from violations where only marginal reductions are appropriate (e.g.
ordinary crime like theft).
2. Another ongoing controversy in legal scholarship is about the existence
of and the relation between fine-reductions before or after the detection
of a criminal act. While it is widely accepted that confessions in a le-
gal litigation should influence the fine, the deterrence effect of leniency
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programs or tax-amnesties (where a violator voluntarily reports a crim-
inal act) is still under discussion. In the fifth chapter we provided an
economical analysis of the relation between optimal fines in different
self-reporting stages. First, we have shown that (partial) self-reporting
is optimal in both stages. Second, we have proven that an increasing
harm level without self-reporting early in the game does not necessarily
lead to a higher fine reduction at this stage due to the relation between
optimal fines in both stages.
3. Self-reporting schemes are well established as an enforcement tool against
criminal teams (like e.g. cartels). Legal scholars stress their importance
before the detection of a criminal act, as the threat of races-to-the-
court-room will provide mistrust among cartel members that increases
the maintenance costs of a criminal team. In contrast the theoretical lit-
erature consists of very few papers that focus on a Prisoner’s Dilemma
structure of law enforcement after the violation has been detected or
stress the role of subsidies as an optimal tool to deterre collusive agree-
ments. In chapter 6, we translated the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure to
schemes with self-reporting before the criminal act has been detected.
This model captures a race-to-the-courtroom as a dominant strategy
for the members of a criminal team. We have shown that endogenized
cooperation probabilities and imperfect monitoring by the authority
are serious drawbacks of such a kind of enforcement scheme.
4. Economists’ suggestion that subsidies are able to deterre collusive agree-
ments or cartels neglects - as the basic literature in the single violator
case - the option value of self-reporting. In chapter 7 we developed a
model that captures this and other important features of existing le-
niency programs against cartel prosecution. We show that subsidies
equal to future benefits from cartel bevavior (or full amnesties in a
model of sunk benefits) are in general suboptimal due to the option
value. Furthermore, we compared our findings to the existing leniency
programs in the EU and the USA. According to our results one has
to be sceptical with the US approach to grant full immunity to the
first one who self-reports his cartel activity. First, full immunity is not
optimal regardless of the underlying distribution of types. Second -
and more important - full immunity should only be granted to a cartel
member who provides more evidence than his accomplices could have
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done. Therefore, fine reductions conditional on the degree of evidence
provided - as implemented in the EU system - seem to be appropriate.
Another critical aspect is the exclusion of fine reductions for subse-
quent self-reporters in the US system. As long as there are any pay-
offs from self-reporting (like savings of litigation costs etc.) this will be
suboptimal. Finally, there is no need to grant full immunity for car-
tel members that self-report after the violation has been detected as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma kind of fine structure should be feasible (apart from
the drawbacks mentioned in chapter 6) such that everyone self-reports
in equilibrium while deterrence is maximized.
Appendix A
Proofs
A.1 Chapter 4
Optimization Program
The different terms in the first-order conditions are given by
∂λ
∂r
= −g(θ˜) 1
ps
< 0
∂b˜
∂r
= λ− r
ps
g(θ˜) +
r
ps
g(θ˜) = λ > 0
∂pi
∂r
= −f (˜b)λ < 0
∂λ
∂p
= g(θ˜)
r
p2s
> 0
∂b˜
∂p
=
∫ θ˜
0
θsg(θ)dθ > 0
∂pi
∂p
= −f (˜b)
∫ θ˜
0
θsg(θ)dθ < 0. (A.1)
A sufficient condition for a solution of Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6) to be an interior
minimum is ∂
2SC
∂r2
> 0 together with detH > 01. The different parts of H are
1Which implies ∂
2SC
∂p2 > 0.
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given by
∂2SC
∂p2
=
∂2pi
∂p2
h− c(∂pi
∂p
λ+
∂λ
∂p
pi)
−cp(∂
2pi
∂p2
λ+ 2
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∂p
∂pi
∂p
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∂2λ
∂p2
pi)
+
∂b˜
∂p
f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂p
+ b˜f ′(˜b)
(
∂b˜
∂p
)2
+ b˜f (˜b)
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∂r∂p
=
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(A.2)
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where
∂2λ
∂r2
= −g′(θ˜)
(
1
ps
)2
∂2λ
∂p2
= −g′(θ˜)
(
r
p2s
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− g(θ˜) 2r
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∂λ
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∂2pi
∂p2
= −f ′(˜b)
(
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∂p
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∂2pi
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2b˜
∂p∂r
. (A.3)
Proof of Proposition 4.1
For r = ps (and thus θ˜ = 1 and λ = 0), we get ∂pi
∂r
= −f (˜b)λ = 0 and
∂b˜
∂r
= λ = 0 such that
∂SC
∂r
(r = ps) =
∂pi
∂r
(h− cpλ)− cppi∂λ
∂r
) = cppi
g(1)
ps
(A.4)
which is positive as long as g(1) 6= 0 such that r∗ 6= ps in this case. If
g(1) = 0 we get
∂2SC
∂r2
(r = ps) =
g(1)
ps
f (˜b)(h− cpλ) + cpg
′(1)
p2s2
pi − b˜f (˜b)g(1)
ps
such that ∂
2SC
∂r2
(r = ps) = cpg
′(1)
p2s2
pi < 0 for g(1) = 0, because g′(1) < 0 in this
case (as negative densities are excluded). But this implies that r = ps for
g(1) = 0 can only indicate a maximum of social costs.
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Comparative Statics - General Analysis
Exogenous p As to the comparative statics with respect to σ, recall from
Eqn. (4.7), that the sign of dr
dσ
is determined by
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with
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=
∂λ
∂σ
∂2pi
∂r∂σ
= −f ′(˜b) ∂b˜
∂σ
λ− f (˜b)∂λ
∂σ
. (A.6)
With
A = −cp∂λ
∂σ
pi
B =
∂pi
∂r
(h− cpλ)
D = b˜f (˜b)
∂b˜
∂r
, (A.7)
marginal costs are given by
∂SC
∂r
= A+B +D (A.8)
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where A expresses the marginal benefit from self-reporting, B captures the
marginal costs, and D are the additional marginal benefits if crime is non-
illicit. This allows to rewrite Eqn. (A.5) using2
∂A
∂σ
= −cp(−∂g(θ˜)
∂σ
)
1
ps
− g(θ˜)
ps
1
b
∂b˜
∂σ
)
∂B
∂σ
=
1
b
∂λ
∂σ
(2cpλ− h)
∂D
∂σ
=
∂b˜
∂σ
1
b
∂b˜
∂r
+ b˜
1
b
∂2b˜
∂r∂σ
. (A.9)
To prove the feasibility of a certain r∗, it is useful to analyze the compar-
ative statics with respect to h and c. As
∂2SC
∂r∂h
=
∂pi
∂r
< 0,
it follows that dr
∗
dh
> 0 if p exogenous. Therefore r∗ : h→ r∗(h) is a surjective
mapping from (0,∞) to [0, ps). In fact, it can be shown that these results
carry over to endogenous monitoring if social costs are supermodular.3
Comparative Statics - Uniform Distribution
Exogenous p Now, we derive the different contributions to Eqs. (A.9)
for a uniform distribution. First note that
σ =
√∫ 1/2+a
1/2−a
(θ − 1
2
)2
2a
dθ =
a√
3
(A.10)
such that a =
√
3σ and consequently dz(x,a(σ))
dσ
= dz(x,a)
da
√
3 for every function
z(x, a). Therefore, we can safely restrict attention to the a-dependence and
get
∂g(θ)
∂a
= − 1
2a2
< 0
∂b˜
∂a
= − 1
16
4rps− 4r2 − p2s2 + 4p2s2a2
psa2
< 0 (A.11)
2We assume that b is uniformly distributed throughout.
3Proof available on request.
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as r ∈ [(1
2
− a)ps, (1
2
+ a)ps]. All in all, we get
∂A
∂a
= −c(4rps+ 4raps− 8Bpsa− 4r
2 − p2s2 + 2p2s2a)
16ps2a3b
(A.12)
which is positive for all r ∈ [(1/2− a)ps, (1/2 + a)ps]. Furthermore,
∂λ
∂a
=
2r − ps
4a2ps
(A.13)
is positive (negative) iff r > (<)1/2ps. As to (2cpλ− h) note that as long as
crime is illicit and θ is uniformly distributed, Eqn. (A.2) simplifies to
∂2SC
∂r2
=
g(θ˜)r
bp2s
(h− 3cpλ) (A.14)
(as ∂
2λ
∂r2
= −g′(θ˜)
p2s2
vanishes for a uniform distribution4) which is positive for
any interior solution. Therefore (2cpλ− h) < 0 if crime is illicit. If crime is
non-illicit, Eqn. (A.2) becomes
∂2SC
∂r2
=
g(θ˜)r
bp2s
(h− 3cpλ− b˜) + λ
2
b
(A.15)
such that (3cpλ + b˜ − h) < λ2p2s
g(θ˜)
for any interior solution. Furthermore, we
know that ∂b˜
∂r
= λ (and thus ∂
2b˜
∂r∂a
= ∂λ
∂a
) such that we have fully determined
the signs of the different contributions in Eqs. (A.9).
Endogenous p For endogenous p and uniformly distributed θ, it will
prove useful to consider the different parts of Eqn. (4.7). While ∂
2SC
∂r∂a
< 0
will be shown in the proof of Result 4.1 (see below), ∂
2SC
∂r2
> 0 holds for any
interior solution. Therefore, we are left with
∂2SC
∂p∂r
=
16rhsa2 − 16rhsa− 12cr2 + cp2s2 + 5cp2s2a+ 12car2
p2s2ba2
∂2SC
∂p∂a
=
8hsar2 − 8hs3a3p2 + 16hs3a4p2 + cp3s3a
16s2p2ba3
+
−16cp3s3a4 + 4cp3s3a3 + 8cr3 + 4cp2s2a3r
16s2p2ba3
.
4This is the reason why (2cpλ−h) is not necessarily negative for a normal distribution.
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Note that this implies that ∂
2SC
∂r∂p
< 0 for h sufficiently large, while ∂
2SC
∂p∂a
> 0
if h is sufficiently large because then the numerator is increasing in r, and
positive even for the smallest feasible r = (1/2− a)ps.
Proof of Result 4.1
r∗ =
1
6c
(6caps+ 3cps− 4hsa+ 2
√
2
√
Ssa) (A.16)
where S ≡ 2h2sa + 3c2p2s − 6c2bp. With r∗ as given in Eqn.(A.16), we
get
dr∗
da
=
1
6c
(6cps− 4hs+
√
2(sS + 2s2ah2)√
Ssa
). (A.17)
First note that dr
∗
da
(p = 0) = 0. Furthermore,
ddr
∗
da
dp
= s
(
1 +
3
√
2(c3p((sp− b)2 + b)
S
√
Ssa
)
(A.18)
which is positive because S > 0 for any interior solution.
Proof of Result 4.2
For the different contributions in Eqs. (A.9) note that for a normal distribu-
tion ∂g(θ)
∂σ
< 0 if θ˜ = 1
2
and that ∂g(θ)
∂σ
≥ 0 if θ˜ → 1 if σ is sufficiently small.
Furthermore,
∂b˜
∂σ
= − 1√
2pi2σ2
(
re−
1
8σ2 + 2psσ2
(
e−
1
8σ2
( 2r−psps )
2
− e− 18σ2
))
< 0 (A.19)
as long as r ∈ (0, ps].5 This implies that ∂A
∂σ
> 0 for θ˜ → 1. For θ˜ = 1
2
, note
that
∂A
∂σ
(r =
ps
2
) = − 1
4
√
2pi
4σb− 4σ2ps+ e− 18σ2 ps(4σ2 − 1)
σ3psb
(A.20)
5The term in brackets is positive because (ps− 2r)2 < p2s2.
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which is negative for σ sufficiently small. Furthermore, ∂B
∂σ
= 0 for θ˜ ∈ {1
2
, 1},
because
∂λ
∂σ
= − ps− 2r
2
√
2piσ2ps
e
− (ps−2r)2
8σ2p2s2) (A.21)
is positive (negative) for r > (<)ps
2
and vanishes for r = ps
2
and r → ps if σ
is sufficiently small.
Proof of Result 4.3
Recall that we know from the proof of Result 1 that ∂A
∂a
< 0. Therefore, we
are left with
∂B
∂a
+
∂D
∂a
=
1
b
∂λ
∂a
(2cpλ+ b˜− h) + ∂b˜
∂a
1
b
λ. (A.22)
With Eqn. (A.15), we know that
∂B
∂a
+
∂D
∂a
<
1
b
∂λ
∂a
λ2p2s
g(θ˜)
+
∂b˜
∂a
1
b
λ. (A.23)
Since we know that ∂b˜
∂a
< 0, and that ∂λ
∂a
< 0 for θ˜ < 1
2
, it remains to be
shown that ∂B+∂D
∂a
< 0 if θ˜ > 1
2
as well. To see this note that with g(θ) = 1
2a
we get
X ≡ ∂λ
∂a
2ap2sλ+
∂b˜
∂a
= −p
2s2 + 4p2s2a− 4rps− 8apsr + 4r2 + 4p2s2a2
16psa2
. (A.24)
But this expression is negative for r > ps
2
(and θ˜ > 1
2
) because X(r = ps
2
) =
−ps
4
, X(r = (1/2 + a)ps) = 0 and
∂X
∂r
=
ps+ 2aps− 2r
4a2ps
> 0 (A.25)
as the last expression is decreasing in r and vanishes for r = (1/2 + a)ps.
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Proof of Result 4.4
From Eqn. (4.7), we know that the sign of dr
∗
da
is identical to the sign of X ≡
−∂2SC
∂p2
∂2SC
∂r∂a
+ ∂
2SC
∂r∂p
∂2SC
∂p∂a
. We further know from the SOC and from Result 4.1
that ∂
2SC
∂p2
> 0 and ∂
2SC
∂r∂a
< 0 which displays the direct effect already discussed
in Result 4.1. To determine the sign of the sum of the direct and the indirect
effect, recall that for any interior solution detH = ∂
2SC
∂p2
∂2SC
∂r2
−
(
∂2SC
∂p∂r
)2
> 0.
This allows us to estimate
X > −
(
∂2SC
∂r∂p
)2
∂2SC
∂r2
∂2SC
∂r∂a
+
∂2SC
∂r∂p
∂2SC
∂p∂a
≡ Y. (A.26)
For the sign of Y , we first eliminate some exogenous parameters by means
of normalization. First, note that the maximum feasible fine s becomes
irrelevant for the sign of Y if we normalize fines and benefits to fractions of s
by setting r′ ≡ r
s
and b
′
= b
s
. Second, we normalize h′ ≡ h
c
such that harm is
expressed in units of costs c. This allows us to re-express social costs in units
of c, such that any further discussion of signs of the social cost function and
its derivatives is independent of c. After all, we reduced the set of (relevant)
exogenous variables to (h′, b
′
, a) while endogenous variables are now given
by (r′, p). To further reduce the number of parameters note that ∂Y
∂b
′ < 0 as
shown in Fig. 4.4 where ∂Y
∂b
′ is plotted against p and r′. Therefore
Y > Y (bmax) (A.27)
where bmax is the maximum b that exhibits an interior solution. Recall from
the proof of Result 4.1 that S ≡ 2h2sa+3c2p2s−6c2bp has to be positive for
any interior solution. The maximum feasible b
′
is therefore given by b
′
max =
2h2a+3c2p2
6c2p
. In Fig. 4.5 Y (b
′
max, (r
′)∗, p∗) is plotted against the remaining
parameters (h′, a) to show that Y > 0.6
6Actually, this is not a rigorous proof as we would have to plot for h → ∞. However,
from the first order conditions it immediately follows that r∗ → ps as h→∞ anyway.
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A.2 Chapter 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1
Part(i)
∂θ˜1
∂p1
= − r1
(p1)2φ
< 0.
∂θ˜1
∂r1
=
1
p1φ
> 0.
∂θ˜1
∂p2
= − r1
p1φ2
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s < 0.
∂θ˜1
∂r2
= − r1
p1φ2
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2 < 0. (A.28)
Part(ii)
∂2θ˜1
∂p1∂p2
=
1
(p1φ)2
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s > 0.
∂2θ˜1
∂p1∂r2
=
1
(p1φ)2
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2 > 0. (A.29)
Part(iii)
∂2θ˜1
∂r1∂p1
= − 1
p21φ
< 0.
∂2θ˜1
∂r1∂p2
= − 1
p1φ2
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s < 0. (A.30)
Part(iv)
∂2θ˜1
∂r1∂r2
= − 1
p1φ2
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2 < 0. (A.31)
Part(v)
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∂θ˜1
∂p2∂r2
=
r1
p1φ3
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s
− r1
p2p1φ2
θ˜2g2(θ˜2) (A.32)
Proof of Lemma 5.2
Part(i)
∂b˜
∂p1
=
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1φ > 0.
∂b˜
∂r1
=
∫ 1
θ˜1
g1(θ1)dθ1 > 0.
∂b˜
∂p2
=
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1p1
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s > 0.
∂b˜
∂r2
=
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1p1
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2 > 0. (A.33)
∂2b˜
∂r1∂p1
= −g1(θ˜1)∂θ˜1
∂p1
> 0.
∂2b˜
∂r1∂p2
= −g1(θ˜1)∂θ˜1
∂p2
> 0.
∂2b˜
∂r1∂r2
= −g1(θ˜1)∂θ˜1
∂r1
> 0. (A.34)
Part(iii)
∂2b˜
∂p1∂r2
= θ˜1g1(θ1)φ
∂θ˜1
∂r2
+
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1
∂φ
∂r2
.
∂2b˜
∂p1∂p2
= θ˜1g1(θ1)φ
∂θ˜1
∂p2
+
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1
∂φ
∂p2
(A.35)
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with
∂φ
∂p2
=
∫ θ˜2
0
θ˜2g2(θ2)dθ2s > 0
∂φ
∂r2
=
∫ 1
θ˜2
g2(θ2)dθ2 > 0 (A.36)
Part(iv)
∂2b˜
∂p2∂r2
= θ˜1g1(θ1)
∂θ˜1
∂r2
p1
∫ θ˜2
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s+
∫ θ˜1
0
θ1g1(θ1)dθ1θ˜2g2(θ˜2)s
∂θ˜2
∂r2
.
(A.37)
Proof of Proposition 5.2
A sufficient condition for non-empty sets of self-reporters in both stages 3 and
5 is that SCns > SCb > SC holds for minimized social costs. We restrict our
attention to SCns > SCb, since the proof for SCb > SC proceeds completely
analogously (available on request). We prove by contradiction. Suppose that
social costs are smaller without self-reporting in stage 3. Then, ∂SCb/∂r1 ≤ 0
for r1 = p
b
1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s. Now consider
∂SCb
∂r1
=
∂pib
∂r1
(λb1h1 + (1− λb1)h3) + pib
∂λb1
∂r1
(h1 − h3) (A.38)
where
pib =
∫ b
b˜b
f(b)db.
∂pib
∂r1
= −f (˜bb)
∫ 1
θ˜b1
g1(θ1)dθ1.
∂λb1
∂r1
= −g1(θ˜b1)
1
pb1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s
. (A.39)
But as θ˜1 = 1 for r1 = p
b
1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s, the first term in Eqn.(A.38)
vanishes and Eqn.(A.38) simplifies to
∂SCb
∂r1
=
∫ b
b˜b
f(b)dbg1(1)
h3 − h1
pb1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s
. (A.40)
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But as h1 < h3 by assumption,
∂SCb
∂r1
> 0 and therefore SCns > SCb.
Proof of Corollary 5.1
Again, we restrict our attention to the first self-reporting stage as the proof
for stage 5 is isomorphic. The constrained minimization of social costs faces
the Lagrangian given by
L(p1, p2, r1) = SC
b + C(p) + C(q) + µ(˜bb − b˜ns) (A.41)
with
b˜ns =
∫ 1
0
dθ1θ1g1(θ1)p
ns
1
∫ 1
0
dθ2θ2g2(θ2)p
ns
2 s.
b˜b =
∫ 1
θ˜b1
g1(θ1)dθ1r
b
1 +
∫ θ˜b1
0
θ1p
b
1p
b
2g1(θ1)dθ1
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s. (A.42)
Hence, optimality requires
∂L
∂r1
=
∂SCb
∂r1
+ µ
∂b˜b
∂r1
= 0 (A.43)
∂L
∂µ
= b˜b − b˜ns = 0 (A.44)
To prove the superiority of the self-reporting scheme, it suffices to show that
this conditions can not be fulfilled if r1 = p
b
1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s. With this
assumption, it follows that λb1 = 0 and thus
∂b˜b
∂r1
= 0 . This in turn simplifies
Eqn.(A.43) to
∂L
∂r1
=
∫ b
b˜b
f(b)dbg1(1)
h3 − h1
pb1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s
> 0 (A.45)
Therefore, r1 = p
b
1p
b
2
∫ 1
0
θ2g2(θ2)dθ2s is no candidate solution of the constraint
optimization procedure.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
According to Cramer’s rule, comparative statics of r2 with respect to h2 are
given by
dr2
dh2
= − det J
detH
(A.46)
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where H is the Hesse matrix (Hij =
∂2SC
∂ri∂rj
) and J is the Hesse matrix with
its second column changed into the vector ∂
2SC
∂ri∂h2
with i = 1, 2. Due to the
second order conditions, (detH > 0) and (H11 > 0) have to be fulfilled.
Therefore the sign of Eq.(A.64) is given by
sign(
dr2
dh2
) = −∂
2SC
∂r21
∂2SC
∂r2∂h2
+
∂2SC
∂r2∂r1
∂2SC
∂r1∂h2
(A.47)
Together with the second order condition, the first term in Eq.(A.65) is
positive, as
∂SC
∂h2
= pi(1− λ1)λ2 > 0
∂2SC
∂h2∂r2
= pi(1− λ1) λ2
∂r2
< 0 (A.48)
The second term, however, is ambiguous in sign as H12 Q 0 and
∂2SC
∂h2∂r1
= λ2(
∂pi
∂r1
(1− λ1)− pi∂λ1
∂r1
) Q 0. (A.49)
A.3 Chapter 6
Proof of Proposition 6.3
Part (i). Ω = (2Ps − s ≤ r, l = s, k ≥ Ps, P ) for any given P follows
immediately from the separate design for cooperative and non-cooperative
self-reporters together with Proposition 6.1 and 6.2. P is implicitly given by
the first-order condition,
C ′(P ) = 2f (˜b)h1qs
∫ b
b˜
f(b)db. (A.50)
which follows from minimizing
SC(Ω) =
[∫ b
b˜
f(b)db
]2
[λh1 + (1− λ)h2] + C(P ). (A.51)
with respect to P under the restriction that
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b˜ = qφci + (1− q)φni = qsP + (1− q)s. (A.52)
Part (ii). Using the FOC as an implicit function we get (recall
√
pi =∫ b
b˜
f(b)db)
dP
dq
=
2h1s
(
f (˜b)
√
pi − f ′(˜b)qs(1− P )√pi + f 2(˜b)qs(1− P )
)
∂2SC/∂P 2
(A.53)
First, recall that the denominator must be positive to ensure that P min-
imizes SC. Since the numerator is positive for f ′(˜b) ≤ 0, this is a sufficient
condition for dP
dq
> 0. If f ′(˜bi) > 0, the numerator is negative if
f (˜b)
√
pi + (1− P )qsf (˜b) < f ′(˜b)qs(1− P )√pi. (A.54)
However, the maximum f ′(˜b) feasible is bounded by the SOC for P , and
hence by
f ′(˜b) <
C ′′(P ) + 2f 2(˜b)(qs)2h1
2h1(qs)2
√
pi
Therefore dP
dq
can only be negative for a sufficiently convex cost function.
Proof of Proposition 6.4
Part (i). The inequalities for re and ke follow from the same argument as in
the basic model. le = Pes+
t
2
follows from minimizing SC (see Eqn. (6.9) in
the text) with respect to le and Pe. Making use of b˜e as given in Eqn. (6.12),
we get
∂SC(Ωe)
∂Pe
= −2f (˜be)h12s
t
(le − Pes)
∫ b
b˜e
f(b)db+ C ′(Pe) = 0 (A.55)
and
∂SC(Ωe)
∂le
= −2f (˜be)h1
∫ b
b˜e
f(b)db
[
2
t
(Pes− le) + 1
]
= 0.
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Simplifying yields
le = Pes+
t
2
(A.56)
C ′(Pe) = 2f (˜be)h1s
∫ b
b˜e
f(b)db.
Part (ii). le = Pes+
t
2
is an interior optimum only if SC(Ω) is increasing
in le at le = s. From
∂SC(Ω)
∂le
, we know that this is the case if and only if
2
t
(Pes− le) + 1 < 0 for le = s. Hence, 2t (Pes− s) + 1 < 0 or s > t2(1−Pe) as
expressed in Proposition 6.4.
Proof of Proposition 6.5
Part (i). We prove by contradiction. Ω as stated in the Proposition induces
self-reporting as a dominant strategy for all P ∈ (0, 1). The expected fine
is then l∗i = (αi + P
∗ − αiP ∗) s. Now suppose r∗ > P ∗s. Then, N/N with
expected fine P ∗s is also an equilibrium. Since P ∗s < (α+ P ∗ − αP ∗) s, this
leads to higher a criminal rate at no benefit. Hence, r∗ ≤ P ∗s ∀P ∗. Next,
suppose li > l
∗
i is chosen. Then, S/S is no equilibrium. Instead, there are
two asymmetric equilibria, namely N/S and S/N . The maximum expected
fine is then r = P ∗s ∀P ∗. Since P ∗s < (αi + P ∗ − αiP ∗) s, this leads again
to higher a criminal rate at no benefit. Finally, suppose l < l∗ . Then, the
only equilibrium is S/S, but the expected fine is decreasing without benefit.
Thus, Ω∗ as stated in Proposition 6.5 is optimal.
Part (ii). Follows from
∂l∗i
∂αi
= (1− P ∗)s > 0.
Part (iii). Since the borderline type who wishes to violate the law is then
given by l∗i = (αi + P
∗ − αiP ∗) s, minimizing SC yields the FOC for P as
stated in the Proposition.
Part (iv). Taking the total derivative of P ∗ with respect to αi yields
dP ∗
dαi
= − 1
∂2SC/∂P ∗2
(f(l∗i )
∫ b
l∗j
f(b)dbh1s (A.57)
+f(l∗j )f(l
∗
i )(1− P ∗)(1− αj)h1s2
−f ′(l∗i )(1− P ∗)
∫ b
l∗j
f(b)dbh1(1− αi)s2)
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The denominator must be positive to ensure that P ∗ minimizes SC. Since
the numerator is positive for f ′(l∗i ) ≤ 0, this is a sufficient condition for
dP ∗
dαi
< 0. If f ′(l∗i ) > 0, the numerator can be negative. However, the max-
imum f ′(l∗i ) feasible is bounded by the SOC for P
∗ as in Proposition 6.3.
Therefore dP
∗
dαi
can only be positive for a sufficiently convex cost function.
A.4 Chapter 7
Proof of Proposition 7.1
Let us define φ1 as the policy vector with respect to the detection stage,
and φ2 as the vector for the conviction stage. Hence, φ1 ≡ (p1, ri1), φ2 ≡
(p2, r
i
2b, r
i
2s), and Φ ≡ (φ1, φ2). We will prove in the following that for any φ1,
minimization of SC requires that φ2 is given by p2 = ², r
H(L)
2b = αL(αH)s− ²,
and either rH2s = 0 or/and r
L
2s = 0. Recall that we adopt Kaldor-Hicks
dominance as equilibrium selection criterion in case of multiple equilibria.
If N ≡ NH/NL is the equilibrium played, then we have Φ2(N) = 2p2s. To
destroy the N-equilibrium, the authority must choose rH2s < p2s and/or r
L
2s <
p2s. This given, S ≡ S/S is the unique Nash Equilibrium if rH2b < αLs and
rh2b < αHs hold. Aggregated fines are then Φ2(S) = s(αL+αH)−2ε. If rH2b ≥
αLs or r
L
2s ≥ αHs, then the asymmetric decisions SH/NL and SL/NH become
equilibria, leading to maximum aggregated fines Φ2(SH/NL) = αHs+p2s and
Φ2(SL/NH) = αLs + p2s, respectively (for higher fines, N will be played).
From p2 < αL, it follows that Φ2(·) is maximized if the authority induces
self-reporting by both parties, which allows for maximum fines αHs− ε and
αLs−ε, respectively. Since Φ2 is independent of p2, p2 → 0 is optimal, which
requires rL2s and/or r
H
2s = 0.
Proof of Lemma 7.1
Part (i). Define p1 and r
H
1 as the authority’s optimal choices when mini-
mizing SC (SH/NL;N). Assume next that the authority chooses the same
values p1 and r
H
1 , but r
L
1 = αHs − ε, thereby destroying the SH/NL- and
implementing the S-equilibrium. Although this does not have to be opti-
mal for the S-equilibrium, we have SC
(
Sθ˜H ;N, p1, r
H
1
)
< SC (SH/NL;N)
since θ˜H is identical, and since
(
0.5
(
rH1 + αLs
)
+ αHs
)
>
(
rH1 + αHs
)
due
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to αLs > r
H
1 = θp1αLs. Next, define SC(Sθ˜H ;N) as the minimum so-
cial costs for the (Sθ˜H ;N)-equilibrium. From optimality, it follows that
SC(Sθ˜H ;N) ≤ SC
(
Sθ˜H ;N, p1, r
H
1
)
. Part (ii) can be proven analogously.
Proof of Proposition 7.2
(i) To prove SC(Sθ˜L) > SC(Sθ˜H ) (and consequently r
L
1 = αHs) assume that
rL1 and p1 minimize SC(Sθ˜L ;N). Furthermore, assume that the authority
sub-optimally implements p1 and r
H
1 = r
L
1 such that θ˜H = θ˜L, and therefore
Φ
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
≥
∫ θ˜L
0
θp1s (αL + αH) g(θ)dθ
+
∫ 1
θ˜L
(
0.5
(
rL1
αL
αH
+ αLs
)
+ αHs
)
g(θ)dθ (A.58)
such that
Φ
(
Sθ˜H ;N
)
− Φ
(
Sθ˜L ;N
)
>∫ 1
θ˜L
(0.5(
αL
αH
rL1 − rL1 + αLs− αHs) + (αH − αL)s)g(θ)dθ ≥ 0(A.59)
where we have used that rL1 ≤ αHs.
(ii)Minimizing social costs leads to the first order conditions
f(Φ)h
∂Φ
∂p1
= C ′(p1)
f(Φ)h
∂Φ
∂rH1
= 0 (A.60)
that implicitly define p1 and r
H
1 with
∂Φ
∂p1
= − g(θ˜H)
p21αLs
(
1
2
rH1 +
αH
αL
rH1 −
1
2
αLs− αHs) +
∫ θ˜H
0
θs(αL + αH)g(θ)dθ > 0
(A.61)
and
∂Φ
∂rH1
=
g(θ˜H)
p1αLs
(
1
2
rH1 +
αH
αL
rH1 −
1
2
αLs− αHs) + 1
2
∫ 1
θ˜H
g(θ)dθ. (A.62)
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Note that the first order conditions imply p1 ∈ (0, 1) due to the assump-
tions on C1(p1), while r
H
1 ∈ [0, 1) because ∂Φ∂rH1 (r
H
1 = αLp1s) < 0 (as the
term in brackets in Eqs. (A.62) is negative). Note that rH1 = 0 implies that
p1 → 0.
(iii) Follows immediately from part (i) and Lemma 7.1.
(iv) A sufficient condition for rH1 ∈ (0, 1) is g(0) = 0 as this implies
∂Φ
∂rH1
(rH1 = 0) > 0. A sufficient condition for r
H
1 = 0 is g
′(θ) ≤ 0 as this
implies that
∂2Φ
∂(rH1 )
2
=
g′(θ˜H)
(p1αLs)2
(
1
2
rH1 +
αH
αL
rH1 −
1
2
αLs− αHs)
+
g(θ˜H)
p1αLs
(
αL + 2αH
2αL
)− 1
2p1αLs
g(θ˜H) > 0. (A.63)
which excludes an interior solution.
Comparative statics
From Cramer’s rule, we get
drH1
dαH
= − det J
detH
(A.64)
where H is the Hesse matrix (Hij =
∂2SC
∂xi∂xj
) with x1 = r
H
1 and x2 = p1. J is
the Hesse matrix with its first column changed into the vector ∂
2SC
∂xi∂αH
with
i = 1, 2. Due to the second order conditions, we know that detH > 0 and
H22 > 0 have to be fulfilled. Therefore, the sign of Eq.(A.64) is given by
sign(
drH1
dαH
) = −∂
2SC
∂p21
∂2SC
∂rH1 ∂αH
+
∂2SC
∂p1∂αH
∂2SC
∂p1∂rH1
(A.65)
Appendix B
Figures
Figure 4.1: Density and Heterogeneity
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Figure 4.2: ∂λ
∂a
(Uniform Distribution)
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Figure 4.3: ∂λ
∂a
(Normal Distribution)
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